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This study examines whether firms’ decisions to offer company stock in defined 
contribution (DC) plans are explained by managers’ corporate control motives. Using a 
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sponsored proposals. This suggests that managers encourage employee DC holdings in 
company stock in order to receive higher voting support in favor of management. The 
effects of employee ownership on voting outcomes are significantly greater in subsample 
tests than in full sample tests: management proposals opposed by Institutional Shareholder 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
From the perspective of employees, holding a large share of Defined Contribution 
(DC) plans invested in company stock in the firms they work for is inefficient since it 
exposes them to an unnecessary amount of diversifiable risk. Further, company stock in 
DC plans ties the value of the employee’s human capital together with the value of their 
retirement savings. This can lead to a situation where the employee’s labor income and 
retirement savings fall simultaneously, exacerbating the personal effects of negative 
economic shocks. 
However, a non-trivial number of firms offer participants company stock as an 
investment option in their Defined Contribution (DC) plans. Moreover, they often offer 
employer matching with company stock even if participants choose investment options 
other than the company’s stock.1 Given that employers’ decisions to include company 
stock in DC plans lead to unnecessary risk for their employees, it is natural to question 
the rationale behind this decision. To date, only a few studies have attempted to 
investigate the motivations behind this practice .2 For example, Rauh (2006) argues that 
managers offer employees company stock in DC plans as a takeover defense by showing 
that the changes in Delaware case law in the mid-1990s, which made takeovers more 
difficult for outside shareholders to successfully complete, lowered employee ownership. 
Rauh's study suggests that employer stock is a substitute takeover defense. Brown, Liang, 
and Weisbenner (2006) investigate why companies decide to offer matches in company 
stock and find that firms that have lower stock price volatility, lower bankruptcy risk, and 
a defined benefit plan are more likely to provide company stock matches.  
Motivated by Rauh (2006), this paper explores whether firms’ decisions to offer 
company stock in their employee’s DC plans can be explained by managers’ corporate 
control motives. Given the fact that the market for takeover activity has not been as 
                                           
1 Holden and VanDerhei (2003) show that, among plans that offer employer stock in DC plans, on average, 
38% of DC assets are in their own company stock as of year-end 2002. Using the 11(K) filings during the 
period from 1991 to 2000, Brown et al. (2006) show that 39.3% of their sample firms offering company 
stock in DC plans match with employer stock for employer contributions. 
 
2 Most studies on the motivation behind offering company stock focus on Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans, which is one type of DC plan.  
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widespread since the 1990s, and instead shareholder activism through the proxy process 
has been more pervasive, I conduct tests in the setting of annual proxy voting. In 
particular, I hypothesize that managers provide company stock in order to receive a 
higher level of support for management in proxy voting. This hypothesis assumes that 
employee owners vote in favor of management. This assumption is supported by the fact 
that voting rights on employee ownership in DC plans are largely delegated to plan 
trustees. Further, plan trustees have voting authority for all unallocated shares as well as 
those allocated shares when plan participants do not provide any direction on voting. 
Given the fact that plan trustees are appointed by management, the trustees are more 
likely to support management rather than act in the best interests of their participants 
(Chang and Mayers,1992; Chaplinsky and Niehaus, 1990; Gordon and Pound, 1990). 
Even though employee owners participate in voting, they may curb shareholder value 
maximization by voting with management due to employee’s fixed claims on a firm’s 
cash flow, such as wages (Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck, 2006; Jensen and Meckling, 
1979).3 
Using a panel of 10,093 U.S. firms with 72,560 management sponsored proposals 
and 4,436 shareholder sponsored proposals over the 2003 to 2012 period, I find a positive 
association between employee ownership in DC plans and voting support for 
management.4 Specifically, firms with higher employee ownership receive higher levels 
of voting support for management sponsored compared to firms with lower employee 
ownership. In management sponsored proposals, the OLS results show that a one 
standard deviation increase in percent of employee ownership in a firm’s equity market 
value raises “For” votes 0.1 percentage points. Even though a small increase in votes for 
management may have little impact on whether the proposal is passed or fails, this is 
meaningful given the evidence that a lower level of votes leads to changes in board, 
                                           
3 Further details are described in the next section. 
 
4 In most cases, management tends to vote for management sponsored proposals but vote against 
shareholder sponsored proposals. In my sample, more than 99.9% of management proposals are 
recommended by management while 0.03% of shareholder proposals are recommended by management. 
Therefore, voting support in favor of management can be interpreted as having higher levels of voting 
support for management sponsored proposal but lower levels of voting support for shareholder sponsored 
proposals. 
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management, and other governance related issues (Cai, Garner, and Walkling, 2009; 
Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch, 2013; Fischer, Gramlich, Miller, and White, 2009; Yermack, 
2010). The results are robust after controlling for other factors affecting voting outcomes, 
such as firms’ financial strength, managerial ownership, ISS recommendation, voting 
mechanism, and proxy variables for corporate governance.  
I conduct several additional subsample tests. First, I separately look at cases 
consisting of management-sponsored proposals opposed by Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS). The previous literature shows that ISS is the most influential proxy 
adviser and votes can be swayed up to 20% due to the influence of ISS recommendations 
(Bethel and Gillan, 2002; Cai et al., 2009; Choi, Fisch, and Kahan, 2010). Thus, this is 
when the support of a block percentage of employee ownership can be most useful to 
management. In other words, employee voting rights can be more usefully called for 
when the level of voting support for management is expected to be lower due to the 
influence of a proxy adviser. The next subsample test consists of only close votes where 
the levels of voting support are either just above or below 50%. The rationale for 
examining close votes is that if management has information about the likely outcome of 
voting at a time when it can do something to change the outcome, managers would 
encourage trustees and employees to support their proposals for a successful vote.5 Thus, 
given that the marginal effects of voting support for management are greater for 
proposals that have around 50% of voting support, I expect that the results will be 
stronger in close votes.6 Lastly, I conduct subsample tests separately for director 
election, director related, compensation related, and say on pay frequency proposals. 
These proposals are of particular interest because they are the most common proposals. 
                                           
5 Listokin (2008) finds that there is a large difference between the frequency of management sponsored 
proposals passing with votes just above 50% and the frequency of proposals failing with votes just below 
50%. In this study, close votes are defined as the levels of voting support between 30% and 70%. As shown 
in Figure A1 in the Appendix, there is a discontinuity in the distribution of voting outcomes in 
management-sponsored votes at the 50% level. 
 
6 This is because, with a small shift, management can win the proposal as the marginal effect in close votes 
of voting shift from employees and trustees is large. However, management will withdraw or alter the 
proposal if managers predict that the proposal will fail with far below 50% support. Furthermore, 
management will not act if managers predict that the proposal will win with far above 50% support. Due to 
a limited sample size, here close votes are defined somewhat broadly as situations where the levels of 
voting support are between 30% and 70% and the proposals need greater than 50% support to pass. 
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Specifically, compensation related proposals are closely related to managerial 
entrenchment because they directly influence the economic welfare of management. The 
results show that the effect of employee ownership in voting outcomes is significantly 
greater for director election with more than 20% withheld and for say on pay frequency 
proposals.  
Overall, I find that the effects of employee ownership are much larger for 
proposals in subsamples. For example, in Say on pay frequency proposals, an increase in 
the percent of employee ownership in firms’ equity market value by one standard 
deviation is associated with an increase in the proportion of “For” votes of 0.97 
percentage points. Further, once it is combined with managerial ownership, the effect is 
even stronger. Specifically, increases in the percent of employee ownership by one 
standard deviation and percent of managerial ownership by one standard deviation raise 
the proportion of “For” votes 3.86 percentage points. Considering that Cai et al. (2009) 
find that a 1% decrease in the average votes for compensation committee members 
associates with reductions in abnormal CEO compensation by $143,000 in the following 
year, the effects of employee ownership are economically meaningful.   
If managers’ control motives encourage employees to hold company stock in DC 
plans, the effect of employee ownership on voting support for management will be 
stronger in firms with worse governance mechanisms than in firms with better 
governance mechanisms. To examine whether employee ownership in DC plans has a 
different effect on voting outcomes depending on corporate governance, I examine 
interaction terms between proxies for employee ownership and corporate governance and 
find weak support only for management sponsored proposals.  
I complement Rauh (2006)’s finding by providing evidence that corporate control 
motives are still important in an era when hostile takeovers are not significant. As such, 
my finding contributes to understanding the purpose of employee ownership in pension 
plans from the viewpoint of employers. The paper is organized as follows: Chapter II 
reviews the background, Chapter III describes the sample data, Chapter IV shows the 
empirical results, and Chapter V concludes the paper.  
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
2.1. Company Stock in Defined Contribution Plans 
Over the last three decades, many U.S. employers have continued to switch their 
retirement plans from defined benefit (DB) plans, which guarantee employees a fixed 
retirement income, to defined contribution (DC) plans. Most DC plans are 401(K) plans, 
which allow employees to decide how their savings are invested and let them make pre-
tax contributions to their chosen investment option, which are then matched with either 
cash or company stock by employers. Consequently, DC plans largely place the burden 
on employees to bear the risk of their investments. Originally, Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) were designed to foster employee ownership of a firm’s stock, 
whereas DC plans were retirement savings benefits intended to share the firm’s profits 
with workers through employer contributions that varied based on earnings (Mitchell and 
Utkus, 2002). Consequently, most participants in ESOPs are subject to restrictions on 
diversifying away from employer stock. Since the 1990s, firms have commonly provided 
employer ownership through pension plans, such as 401(K)s, rather than though ESOPs. 
Many of the 401(K) plans that hold company stock are not just DC plans; typically they 
are combined with other features of DC plans. Examples include plans that have a 401(K) 
structure with profit-sharing features, plans that have a 401(K) structure with a stock 
bonus feature, or plans that have 401(K) structure with ESOP features, known as a 
KSOP.7 
                                           
7 Huberman and Sengmueller (2004) explain the differences between DC plans: a 401(K) plan is a type of 
plan that allows employees’ an elective contribution and almost all DC plans are 401(K) plans set up as 
profit sharing; a profit sharing plan is a plan in which employer contributions vary year to year depending 
on the firm’s profits and voting rights of employer stock are not required to pass-through to participants; a 
stock bonus plan is a plan in which employer contributions are matched with company stock; KSOP is a 
plan qualified to borrow money in which employees are allowed to choose one of the investment options on 
the menu and employers contribute with company stock.  I examine all of these types of plans.   
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2.2. What Motivates a Firm to Offer Company Stock in DC Plans? 
 
2.2.1. Managerial entrenchment  
According to Mitchell and Utkus (2002), in 65 of the largest DC plans, employee 
holdings account for about 6% of outstanding market capitalization on average, which 
can be influential in a tight takeover battle. Combined with managerial ownership, the 
deterrence effect on takeover probability can be significant. Given that employees are 
interested in job retention, they are more likely to vote for incumbent managers in proxy 
contests. Therefore, to reduce the risk of a takeover, managers encourage employees to 
hold company stock in DC plans. Consistent with this hypothesis, Rauh (2006) finds that 
the changes in Delaware’s mid-1990s validation of the use of the poison pill in 
conjunction with a staggered board are associated with a reduction in employee 
ownership in DC plans for firms incorporated in Delaware. Furthermore, he shows that 
both managerial ownership and employee ownership have declined in response to the 
Delaware law, suggesting that managers try to shift some of the cost of takeover 
protection to employees through DC plans.  
Although the law requires that a fiduciary agent act in the best interests of plan 
participants, there are several reasons why employees with stock ownership will vote in 
favor of the existing management. First, DC plans (except ESOPs) do not require passing 
through on employer securities, resulting in voting that is delegated to plan trustees.8 
Given that management have full discretion to select plan trustees without shareholder 
assent, it is likely that these trustees side with management (Chang and Mayers,1992; 
Chaplinsky and Niehaus, 1990; Gordon and Pound, 1990). In addition, previous studies 
find that mutual funds are more likely to vote against shareholder proposals in support of 
management, regardless of the best interests of the investors, in order to attract and retain 
assets from the retirement market (Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan, 2012; Davis and Kim, 
2007). Pool, Sialm, and Stefanescu (2013) show that in their sample firms, more than 
75% of DC plans have mutual fund families as trustees. Moreover, in some plans, trustees 
have voting authority for all unallocated shares as well as those allocated shares for 
                                           
8 http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/acemer.htm 
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which participants provide no direction on voting. In other plans, trustees are required to 
vote for the unallocated shares in the same way as employee shareholders vote for 
allocated shares, which is called proportional voting. In either case, these shares are 
expected to provide votes in favor of management. 
Second, even with pass through voting, employee owners may curb shareholder 
value maximization by voting with management due to employees’ fixed claims on a 
firm’s cash flow, such as wages. Jensen and Meckling (1979) argue that maintaining 
sufficient cash flows for wages and benefits is such an important matter for employees. 
Faleye et al. (2006) also argue that employees are primarily concerned about their wages 
and benefits since, in most cases, the present value of expected wages and benefits is 
greater than the present value of employee’s equity stake. Therefore, firms with higher 
employee ownership are more likely to deviate from value maximization relative to other 
firms. Consistent with their argument, they find that firms in which employees own at 
least 5% of outstanding shares are associated with spending less in long-term investment, 
taking less risk, and growing slowly.  
Empirical evidence supports the use of employee stock as a takeover defense. 
Pagano and Volpin (2005) argue that managers may adopt an ESOP as a means of a 
takeover defense, especially when insider ownership is small and they can enjoy greater 
private benefits. Scholes and Wolfson (1990) argue that the main reason why 
management establishes ESOPs is to defend against takeovers; management expects that 
employee shareholders are more likely to side with management than other outside 
shareholders. Chang and Mayers (1992), Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990), and Gordon 
and Pound (1990) document the shareholder wealth effects of ESOPs and show that 
ESOPs are an effective takeover defense. Brown et al. (2006) use 11-K filings to examine 
why some employers provide matching contributions to 401(K) plans in company stock, 
finding that firms that have multiple classes of stock (e.g., dual class shares) are less 
likely to require company stock matches. Considering that employees are likely to hold 
greater employee ownership under matching contributions with company stock and that 
dual class shares are very effective takeover defense (as demonstrated by Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2010)), Brown et al.’s study provides another piece of evidence that 
employee ownership is used as a useful tool to protect the firm from takeover.  
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2.2.2. Alternative motives 
In addition to managerial entrenchment, there are five alternative reasons 
discussed in the literature explaining why management would encourage employee stock 
ownership. The most widely-used explanation is that managers encourage ESOPs to align 
employee interests with shareholder interests. By providing employee ownership, they 
are motivated to work hard and therefore improve productivity. Kruse (2002) summarizes 
empirical studies on productivity at firms with ESOPs, and the evidence is weak at best. 
However, to the extent that employees are free to rebalance company shares into other 
investments and participation in 401(K) plans is optional for employees, the alignment 
effect for DC plans is likely to be weaker than for ESOPs with sales restrictions (Kim and 
Ouimet, in press).  
Second, companies might match using their own shares because it is cheaper than 
spending cash.9 The matching with stock is cheaper for employers since they can issue 
new shares to fund a plan without spending cash on matching contributions, and because 
employers pay smaller administration fees for their own stock than for other investment 
options on the menu (Mitchell and Utkus, 2002). Consistent with this, Core and Guay 
(2001) find that cash-constrained firms substitute equity compensation for cash 
compensation, and that companies with high cash flow shortfalls and high interest 
burdens grant options more extensively to rank-and-file employees.  
Third, when a firm offers an employer match in company stock in a KSOP (the 
combination of an ESOPs and a 401(K) plan), dividends paid on that stock are tax-
deductible. Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein (2007) find that employers cite tax 
benefits as the second most important factor in choosing to match company stock, and 
that those who offer employer stock matching have higher dividend yields than those 
who match in cash.10  
                                           
9 Hawthorne (2002) argues that companies match with their own shares because it is much cheaper than 
spending cash (Institutional Investors, 2002). 
 
10 In Benartzi et al. (2007), the most important reason why employers match with company stock is 
increase motivation and productivity.  
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Fourth, powerful unions can pressure their management for better retirement 
plans and to avoid the non-diversifiable risk that comes from solely holding employer 
stock. Additionally, union leaders can advise and educate employees to diversify their 
holdings and avoid heavy concentrations of employer stock. Cohen (2009) argues that 
self-selection will result in unionized workers being less loyal to the firm and therefore 
less willing to invest in employer stock. Consistent with this argument, there is evidence 
that retirement plans subject to collective bargaining agreements are less likely to invest 
in employer stock (Even and Macpherson, 2006) and that firms are less likely to have 
broad-based stock option plans if at least one of their retirement plans is subject to 
collective bargaining (Kroumova and Sesil, 2006).  
Finally, DB plans promise fixed retirement income to their employees, with 
employers bearing all the investment risk. Therefore, providing a DB plan can 
significantly mitigate the risk of having 401(K) plan assets concentrated in company 
stock for employee retirement wealth. Brown et al. (2006) find that firms with a DB plan 
are more likely to match with their own stock instead of making an unrestricted match.   
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
3.1. Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology 
The main research question of this paper is whether managers encourage their 
employees to hold company stock to receive higher voting support for management in 
proxy voting. To investigate this, I examine the hypothesis that, firms with higher 
employee ownership through DC plans will have higher levels of voting support in favor 
of management than firms with lower (or no) employee ownership. To test this, I estimate 
a model of the following form: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, (1) 
where i indexes firms, t indexes time, j indexes voting outcome for proposals, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the 
percentage of voting support in favor of a given proposal, 𝛼𝑡 and 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 are time 
and industry dummies, 𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 is employee ownership in DC plans, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of 
control variables, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term. The coefficient 𝛽1 measures the effect of 
employee DC holdings invested in company stock on the level of voting support in favor 
of a given proposal. I predict that firms with employee ownership should receive higher 
voting support for management. Thus, 𝛽1 should be positive for management-sponsored 
proposals but negative for shareholder-sponsored proposals.  
If managers’ control motives encourage them to offer employees DC holdings 
invested in company stock, firms with worse governance will have a stronger effect of 
employee ownership on voting outcomes than firms with better governance. Therefore, I 
include interaction terms between employee ownership in DC plans and governance 
mechanisms to test the hypothesis that, the effect of employee ownership in voting 
outcomes is stronger in firms that have weaker governance mechanisms compared to 
firms that have stronger governance. The model I test is:  
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽3(𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, (2) 
where 𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 is employee ownership dummy and 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is governance 
mechanism. The coefficient 𝛽3 measures how the effect varies with the degree of 
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corporate governance. I predict that firms with worse governance should have a higher 
effect of employee ownership on voting outcomes, and therefore, 𝛽3 should be positive 
for firms with worse governance. 
In the empirical analysis described in the next section, I do not use firm fixed 
effects. Instead, I include time and industry dummies. This is because employee 
ownership varies widely across firms while it changes slowly over time within a given 
firm. In other words, there is large cross-sectional variation but little within-firm 
variation. Zhou (2001) argues that firm fixed effects should not be used in testing 
managerial ownership effect on firm performance due to little within-firm variation. 
 
 
3.2. Source of Data and Sample Construction 
Pension data comes from the Form 5500 filings filed with the Department of 
Labor (DOL) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).11 Form 5500 is required to be filed 
annually if plans have 100 or more participants, in order to gauge financial conditions of 
pension benefit plans and welfare benefit plans.12 Form 5500 provides information on 
the amount of employer stock in the plan, the total plan assets, attributes of the plan, and 
whether the plan is subject to a collective bargaining agreement. Data on voting outcomes 
is obtained from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Voting Analytics, which 
contains aggregate voting outcomes for Russell 3000 companies’ shareholder meetings as 
well as the total number of shares outstanding, the total number of votes cast, and the ISS 
vote recommendation.  
Table A1in the Appendix summarizes how the sample is compiled. The initial data 
begins with firms listed on Voting Analytics during the period from 2003 to 2012. I use 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)/ Compustat Merged Database to map 
CUSIP identifier into the IRS Employer Identification Number (EIN). With this EIN, I 
then merge the initial sample firms with firms listed in Form 5500 that have at least one 
                                           
11 Form 5500 is downloadable for free from http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/foia/foia-5500.html 
 
12 There are other types of filings for those companies with less than 100 employees, but I do not include 
them in my sample. 
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DC plan. In case firms have different EINs in the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database 
than in Form 5500, I perform manual matching of each company’s name. This yields 
28,834 plan observations across 3,265 unique firms. Given that Form 5500 is a database 
based on fiscal year periods while more than 75% of proxy voting occurs between April 
and June, the pension data over the period from 2002 to 2011 is used for the initial 
sample firms that have at least one voting outcome from 2003 to 2012. For example, 
Form 5500 for year 2002 is matched to the firms have voting outcomes that occurred 
from January to December of 2003. 
 
The next step is to gather additional information about sample firms: the data on 
firm characteristics are from CRSP and Compustat; the data on governance are from 
RiskMetrics; the data on institutional ownership are from Thomson Financial’s 
CDA/Spectrum; and the data on ownership held by the top 5 executives are from 
Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp. This process reduces the initial sample to 1,695 firms 
with 15,597 plan observations. The sample is further decreased to 11,100 firm-years as I 
keep only the largest plan for firms with more than one DC plan.13 Finally, I match the 
sample firms to voting data using a CUSIP identifier, yielding 10,093 firm-years. As most 
firms have more than one proposal, 72,560 management sponsored proposals and 4,436 
shareholder sponsored proposals are collected over the period from 2003 to 2012. The 
percentage of votes in favor of a proposal is the main dependent variable of this study, 
which will be defined in the next section. 
 
3.3. Construction of Variables and Summary Statistics  
 
3.3.1. Employee ownership measures 
Employee ownership through DC plans is the main independent variable in this 
study. I use three types of metrics to measure the company stock in DC plans. First, I 
create an indicator variable (Employee ownership dummy) equal to one if firms provide 
company stock in DC plans, and zero otherwise. Following Rauh (2006), I use the 
                                           
13 The main results are the same if I sum the plan assets of the plans. 
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percentage of employee holdings invested in DC plans (percent of employee ownership in 
DC plans) and the percentage of a firm’s equity market value that employees hold 
through DC plans (percent of employee ownership in equity market value). According to 
Rauh (2006), the percentage of employee holdings invested in DC plans is a useful 
measure of employee ownership since it is directly related to employee welfare. 
Furthermore, compared to the percentage of a firm’s equity market value that employees 
hold through DC plans, managers have greater control over this given that both 
management and plan trustees determine the investment options of the menu in DC plans. 
However, in this study, percent of employee ownership in equity market value is the most 
important measure of employee ownership affecting voting outcome because the shares 
of the firms’ equity market values owned by employees directly impact voting outcomes 
in proxy voting. The percentage of ownership in a firm’s market value is a traditional 
measure to gauge the impact of institutional or managerial ownership in the voting 
literature (Bethel and Gillan, 2002; Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988; Cai et al., 2009).  
Table 1 (see Appendix A for all tables) presents summary statistics of employee 
ownership for the full Form 5500 sample in Panel A and the final sample in Panel B over 
time. The first two columns report the total number of firms in the sample and the total 
number of firms with non-zero employee ownership in DC plans only. The third column 
provides the percentage of firms with non-zero DC ownership in the sample. The next 
two columns show the percentage of employee DC holdings invested in company stock 
(percent of employee ownership in DC plans) and the percentage of a firm’s equity 
market value owned by employees through DC plans (percent of employee ownership in 
equity market value).  
In the full Form 5500 sample, the number of the full sample firms as well as the 
number of the firms with nonzero DC employee ownership generally decrease over time. 
The percentage of employee DC holdings invested in company stock steadily falls from 
30.4% in 2002 to 20.9% in 2011, reflecting a growing concern about company stock in 
retirement plans after the collapse of Enron.14 Given that there is no notable drop after 
                                           
14 Rauh (2006) uses Form 5500 for the period from 1985 to 1998 and show that the percentage of 
employee DC holdings invested in company stock is 33.43%. Similarly, using Form 5500 for the years 
1990 through1998, Even and Macpherson (2008) show that the percentage of their sample firms that hold 
 14 
2006, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA, 2006) does not seem to prevent 
employees from holding company stock in DC plans.15  
In Panel B of Table 1, there is a general increase in the number of firms as well as 
the number of firms with nonzero DC employee ownership for the final sample, in 
contrast to the full Form 5500 sample. Part of this pattern is due to the fact that voting 
data has covered more firms over the sample period. On average, more than 50% of the 
final sample firms offer employee ownership through their DC plans. Since the ISS 
Voting Analytics database contains vote records for Russell 3000 companies, the 
proportion of the firms with company stock in DC plans in this sample is higher 
compared to the full Form 5500 sample and other papers.16 Similar to the full Form 5500 
sample, both percent of employee ownership in DC plans and percent of employee 
ownership in firms’ equity market value steadily fall over the sample years. The average 
values of both employee metrics in the final sample are similar to those in the full Form 
5500 sample, suggesting that the results of this study can be generalized to the full Form 
5500 samples.  
 
3.3.2. Voting measures 
Voting outcomes are the main dependent variables in this study. The threshold for 
a proposal to be approved and the base for the denominator of the calculation in 
shareholder voting support vary by proposal. I compute the percentage of voting support 
for a proposal by dividing total number of votes cast in favor of the proposal (“For” 
                                           
company stock in DC plan assets is 45.55%.  
15 The Pension Protection Act of 2006 requires that employee contributions to company stock be 
immediately diversifiable. Further, employer contributions should be diversifiable if an employee has at 
least three years of service. However, the PPA 2006 does not cap overall exposure to company stock in DC 
plans, and it still allows employers to direct their matching contributions into company stock. Choi, 
Laibson, and Madrian (2009) argue that allowing employees to diversify their contributions after they are 
received does little to reduce company stock holdings without hindering employers from directing their 
matching contributions into company stock. 
 
16 Mitchell and Utkus (2002) and Purcell (2002) point out large firms tend to offer company stock in DC 
plans. 
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votes) by its “Base”.17 More than 95% of management sponsored proposals are 
approved when the proportion of votes cast in favor of proposals (“For” votes) to their 
“Base” is equal to or greater than a 0.5 threshold, called majority voting rules. The other 
5% of proposals require supermajority voting rules which require more than a simple 
majority voting for passage, such as 2/3 or 3/4. One exception is Director election. 83% 
of sample firms have plurality voting rules whereby a director can be elected with a 
single vote in favor in uncontested elections.18   
Table 2 presents frequency and percentage voting support for proposals by 
categories. Given the fact that some proposals such as anti-takeover related issues are 
more closely aligned with managers’ interests than other proposals, the level of voting 
support for a proposal varies according to the features of the proposal. The ISS groups the 
proposals into several categories. I further adjust some categories by assigning new 
categories such as director election and say on pay frequency proposals and by 
consolidating shareholder proposals related to social issues into one group. As shown in 
Panel A of Table 2, more than 70% of the management sponsored proposals are director 
election. Proposals with majority voting requirements receive higher voting support 
compared to proposals with plurality voting requirements. Routine/Business related and 
Compensation related issues have the next highest occurrences. Say on pay frequency and 
anti-takeover related proposals have the lowest shareholder vote support among 
management sponsored proposals. In shareholder sponsored proposals in Panel B of 
Table 2, director related issues are the most common shareholder proposals while 
compensation related proposals account for the second largest frequencies. Corporate 
governance related proposals received the highest shareholder support while proposals 
                                           
17 “Base” serves as the dominator of the calculation of voting support rate, and there are three popular bases: 
votes cast for and against proposals (total number of “For” and “Against” votes); votes cast for, against, and 
abstain proposals (total number of “For”, “Against”, and “Abstain” votes); total number of outstanding 
shares eligible for vote. Unlike other types of proposals, the ISS report the voting outcomes for Say on pay 
frequency proposals as total number of “annual frequency,” “biennial frequency,” and “triennial” votes. 
Therefore, the percentage of voting support is calculated by dividing total number of shares for which 
management recommends by total number of votes cast for “annual frequency,” “biennial frequency,” and 
“triennial” votes. 
 
18 U.S. public firms started replacing plurality voting rules with majority voting rules in director elections 
in 2006.  
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related to social issues received the lowest level of voting support. I present the similar 
table for subsamples of the proposals opposed by ISS and proposals with close votes in 
the Table A3 in the Appendix. In both subsamples, the proportions of compensation 
related and say on pay frequency proposals are higher compared to all management 
proposals. Table 2 also compares the frequency and the percentage of voting support for 
firms with employer stock to firms without employers stock in DC plans. Overall, 
shareholders of firms that offer company stock provide similar levels of voting support 
for management compared to shareholders of firms that do not offer company stock.  
Table A4 in the Appendix describes agenda items by each category of proposals 
when the number of proposals of an item is submitted more than 10 times over the 
sample period. In director election proposals, 5% of the cases are from proxy contests, 
and these cases receive lower shareholder support than from annual meetings.19 Director 
related proposals include issues on size of board or voting systems such as “declassify 
the board of directors,” “require majority vote for the election,” and “fix number of 
directors.” Compensation related proposals seek to approve/amend compensation plans; 
for example, omnibus stock plans, stock purchase plans, and stock option plans. Say on 
pay frequency proposals are recently adopted non-binding votes which seek a 
shareholders’ advisory vote on executive compensation. Antitakeover related proposals 
include amending antitakeover provisions like the poison pill and supermajority vote 
requirement. Most of Routine/business related proposals consist of “ratify auditors,” 
while most of capitalization related proposals contain “increase authorized common 
stock.”   
Table A4 also describes items on shareholder sponsored proposals. “declassify the 
board of directors,” “require a majority vote for the election of directors,” and “restore or 
provide for cumulative voting” accounts for 75% of director related proposals. 
Compensation related shareholder proposals seek to limit executive compensation or to 
require more disclosure on compensation plans. Most of governance related proposals 
are associated with repealing antitakeover provisions and increasing shareholder rights 
                                           
19 Since the results are very similar if I exclude the proposals submitted in special meeting and proxy 
contest, I do not exclude these cases. 
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such as “submit shareholder rights plan (Poison Pill) to shareholder vote” and “reduce 
supermajority vote requirement.” Finally, miscellaneous and social proposals are 
associated with environment, health, social, and general economic issues.   
 
3.3.3. Governance measures  
Previous literature shows that governance mechanisms impact voting outcomes 
(Ashraf et al., 201e; Cai et al., 2009; Morgan, Poulsen, Wolf, and Yang, 2011). Therefore, 
I include proxies for governance as control variables in the main analysis testing the 
effect of employee ownership on voting outcomes. Further, as previously discussed, well 
defined governance variables are required to examine the effects of interaction terms 
between employee ownership and governance mechanisms. Multiple measures of 
corporate governance, including the degree of managerial entrenchment inhibiting 
takeover threats, the presence of institutional investor monitoring, and the degree of 
product market competition, are used in this study.  
The first governance variable is the entrenchment index (e-index) of Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), which measures the quality of a firm’s governance based on 
six anti-takeover defense provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for 
mergers and charter amendments.20 The index varies between one and six, and a higher 
value of the e-index implies a higher management power against shareholder rights. Since 
the data for the index were reported about every two years until 2006, the index for 2003 
and 2005 are replaced with those for 2002 and 2004 with the assumption that the index 
remains unchanged by the following year.    
I employ the influence of institutional investors through their ownership as the 
second measure of corporate governance. The previous literature shows that institutional 
investors have stronger incentives to monitor management and that this improves the 
governance of firms (Gillan and Starks, 2000). The sum of equity holdings owned by 
                                           
20 There is another widely used measure of governance, which is Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s (2003) G-
index based on twenty-four antitakeover and shareholder right provisions. However, the data after 2006 is 
not available from RiskMetrics Governance. 
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institutional investors (percent of institutional ownership) is from the 13-F filings by 
Thomson Financial and is used as a measure of institutional monitoring.21  
The last measure of corporate governance is the strength of market competition 
documented by Giroud and Mueller (2010). They find support for the argument that 
product market competition can deter managerial opportunistic behavior by showing that 
Business Combination Laws negatively impact firms’ return on assets only for firms in 
concentrated industries. Following their method, I create the Herfindahl index measured 
at the 3-digit SIC codes level. A higher Herfindahl index value indicates higher industry 
concentration and thus implies weaker market competition. Given that industry 
concentration is not a firm-specific choice, it is less likely to be endogenous compared to 
the other two measures of corporate governance.  
 
3.3.4. Descriptive statistics and control variables 
Panel A of Table 3 reports summary statistics for independent, dependent, and 
control variables for the final sample. I compare the mean and standard deviation of 
variables between firms with and without employee ownership. For all sample firms, 
percent of employee ownership in DC plans and percent of employee ownership in firms’ 
equity market value are 11.66% and 1.31% respectively. But these percentages increase to 
21.38% and 2.40% for firms with non-zero employee ownership. Compared to firms 
without employer stock in DC plans, on average firms with DC holdings invested in 
employer stock have a higher E-index (2.36 vs. 2.68), smaller percent of institutional 
ownership (80.27% vs. 75.89%), and higher Herfindahl-index (0.18 vs. 0.20).  
Given the findings in the previous literature showing that firm characteristics 
affect how shareholders vote in proxy voting, I include firm characteristics such as 
percent of managerial ownership, market capitalization, market to book, and past 
performance as control variables.22 Interestingly, firms with employee ownership have 
                                           
21 I also use ownership held by large institutions (the percentage of equity held by institutions owning 5% or 
more of equity) and ownership held by public pension funds in place of percent institutional ownership, and 
the results are similar.    
 
22 I also include other firm characteristics such as leverage, age, and stock volatility, and the results are 
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lower managerial ownership compared to firms without employee ownership, suggesting 
that managers may use company stock in DC plans as a substitute for managerial 
ownership. Firms that provide employee ownership are larger and have lower market to 
book ratio.  
Other than firm characteristics, ISS has a non-trivial influence on proxy voting. 
As a leading proxy advisory firm, ISS gives recommendations on proxy voting by 
publishing general guidelines on each issue of each proposal or by providing case-by-
case recommendations.23 I also include confidential voting dummy given the evidence 
that shareholders are more willing to vote against a proposal when their identities are 
protected (Cai et al., 2009). Lastly, majority voting dummy is added since shareholders 
may have more control over director elections under a majority voting system.24   
                                           
similar.  
23 Cotter, Palmiter, and Thomas (2011) find that voting support of mutual funds decreases by 68.3% for ISS 
unfavorable management proposals and increases by 53.1% for ISS unfavorable shareholder proposals. Choi 
et al. (2010) observe that the cases in which mutual funds always follow management’s vote recommendation 
are twice as common as cases in which mutual funds always follow ISS recommendation. Ashraf et al. (2010) 
detect a negative association between voting support of fund families and pension business ties only for 
shareholder proposals recommended by ISS.  
 
24 I thank Young Sang Kim for providing data on majority voting before 2007. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. Employee Ownership and Voting Outcomes  
The OLS regression results estimated from equation (1) are shown in the first 
three columns in Table 4. The dependent variable is the percentage of votes in support of 
management sponsored proposals, which is confined to the [0, 1] interval. Consequently I 
also utilize the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QLME) to obtain robust methods 
for estimation and compare the results from the OLS regression, but the parameter 
estimates (marginal effects) of either specification are almost identical.25 Therefore, the 
discussion of the results below is based on the estimates of the OLS regression. The last 
two columns in Table 4 present the marginal effects of a Logit model of employee 
ownership on voting outcome. The dependent variable equals one if the proposal is 
passed, otherwise zero. The observations in Table 4 include all management proposals, 
and similar analyses for the subsample are presented later.  
I use three metrics for employee ownership through DC plans as the independent 
variable: employee ownership dummy, percent of employee ownership in DC plan, 
percent of employee ownership in firms’ equity market value. Since the levels of voting 
support for proposals vary by category as shown in Table 4, the dummy for each category 
of management proposals are included along with the control variables mentioned in the 
previous section.  
Table 4 indicates a generally robust effect of employee ownership in DC plans on 
voting support for management sponsored proposals. In the left OLS panel, I find that all 
three measures of employee ownership are significantly and positively associated with 
the average voting of “For” votes of all management sponsored proposals. This suggests 
that firms providing employees company stock in DC plans receive higher voting support 
in favor of management. The coefficient on the employee ownership dummy is 0.4935, 
                                           
25 The conditional expectation of the fractional response model can be written: E(yi|𝐱𝐢) =  G(𝐱𝐢𝛃), where 
the value of yi is limited to between 0 and 1, 𝐱𝐢 is the explanatory variables of i, and G() is a distribution 
function satisfying 0 ≤ G(z) ≤ 1. To estimate the model, I use a Bernoulli log likelihood function defined 
by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). 
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indicating the proportion of “For” votes increases by 0.5 percentage points on average. 
As for the economic magnitude of the effect, an increase in the percent of employee 
ownership in DC plans by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in voting 
“For” of 0.0080*19.08=0.2 percentage points while an increase in the percent of 
employee ownership in firms’ equity market value by one standard deviation is associated 
with an increase in the proportion of “For” votes of 0.0401*2.45=0.1 percentage points. 
The logit results in the right panel show that employee ownership mattered in getting the 
votes to a level that changes a proposal from not passing to passing, although its marginal 
effect is very small. Once again, although a small increase in votes for management due 
to employee ownership may have little impact on whether the proposal is passed or 
failed, it matters since a lower level of votes leads to changes in boards, management, and 
other governance related issues. For example, Cai et al. (2009) show that a 1% decrease 
in the average votes for compensation committee members (chair) associates with 
reductions in abnormal CEO compensation by $143,000 ($220,000) in the following 
year.26 The authors also find that firms with lower levels of votes in director elections are 
more likely to have a higher probability of CEO turnover and removal of poison pills and 
staggered boards. Similarly, Fisher et al. (2009) and Ertimur et al. (2013) document that 
lower levels of director votes lead to higher board turnovers as well.  
Consistent with the previous findings in the literature, I find that governance 
measures are significantly associated with voting outcomes for management sponsored 
proposals except Herfindahl-index. The coefficients on E-index are negative and 
significant in all columns, indicating that firms with higher E-index receive lower voting 
support for management. This implies that managers of “dictator” firms have stronger 
power to exercise control, and thus they are likely to put the proposals that are less 
friendly to shareholders to the vote and that shareholders realize this (Cai et al., 2009). 
Firms with higher institutional holdings (percent of institutional ownership) also reduce 
the “For” votes, which suggests that institutional investors more actively engage in 
monitoring of firms in which they invest by opposing management proposals (Brickley et 
                                           
26 The authors look at a subsample of votes for the compensation committee members (chair) because they 
determine CEO compensation.  
 22 
al., 1988). The last measure of governance, Herfindahl-index is negative in the regression 
with all proposals, although it is statistically insignificant. In less competitive industries 
(higher Herfindahl-index), the opportunities for managerial slack can be more easily 
increased, and managers may propose more management friendly proposals to a vote. 
Therefore, shareholders likely give fewer “For” votes in less competitive industries.   
The coefficients on the other control variables used in Table 4 are largely 
consistent with previous findings in the literature. As expected, ownership held by top 
five executives is positively related to the level of vote for management proposals. The 
coefficient on the managerial ownership ranges from 0.0869 to 0.0872, indicating the 
proportion of “For” votes increases by 0.09 percentage points on average. This is a little 
greater than the effect of employee ownership in voting outcomes when employee 
ownership is measured by percent of employee ownership in firms’ equity market value. 
Brickley et al. (1988), using a sample from 308 antitakeover proposals in 1984, find that 
the influence of managerial ownership on the vote is 0.21 percentage points. Considering 
that the average managerial ownership of Brickley et al. (10.1%) is three times higher 
than that of this study (3.13%), the effect of managerial ownership in voting outcomes in 
this study is comparable to the prior study. Whether ISS supports the proposals has a 
substantially significant impact on voting outcomes. Proposals opposed by ISS receive 
slightly more than 25% fewer votes on average. Choi et al. (2008) document 14.4% fewer 
votes for ISS negative recommendation in director elections and Cai et al. (2009) find 
that ISS negative recommendation decreases director votes by 20.7%. The effect of ISS 
recommendation on voting outcome is much stronger than the governance and ownership 
variables, suggesting subsample tests with ISS opposed management proposals that will 
be presented later.  
Proposals at firms with confidential voting receive lower “For” votes, implying 
that protecting shareholders identities increases their willingness to vote against 
management. The level of support for management tends to increase with firm size and 
market to book ratio. Poorly performing firms receive lower support in favor of 
management.   
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Table 5 displays the OLS regression results from the subsample of management 
sponsored proposals.27 The left panel presents the results from the subsample where ISS 
opposed management proposals, while the right panel shows the results from the 
subsample with close votes that have 30% to 60% of voting support. I proceed with the 
subsample analyses for the proposals receiving unfavorable ISS recommendation because 
the influence of employee voting rights might be more useful when managers expect 
lower voting support due to the influence of ISS. The analyses for close votes are 
motivated by the fact that voting rights on employee ownership are more usefully 
exercised when management can have influence on voting outcomes with a small shift. 
This is because managers get information about the likely outcome of the vote and can 
try to influence shareholders to change their vote or vote for their proposals. As expected, 
employee ownership on voting outcomes becomes significantly larger in the subsample 
analyses. Specifically, the results of the cases of only the ISS “Against” proposals report 
that the coefficient of percent of employee ownership in firms’ equity market value is 
0.0911 percentage points, two times stronger than the results for all management 
proposals. Further, given that ISS against recommendation for management sponsored 
proposals indicate that the ISS does not agree with management, the effect of managerial 
ownership on voting outcomes is also expected to be stronger in this subsample analysis. 
With respect to the economic magnitudes, a one standard deviation increase of percent of 
employee ownership plus a one standard deviation increase of percent managerial 
ownership raises voting support by voting “For” of 0.0911*2.45+0.3388*6.18=2.31 
percentage points. Therefore, the combined employee ownership and managerial 
ownership effect on voting outcomes are especially large when ISS opposes management. 
This suggests that voting rights from employees DC holdings invested in company stock 
are more usefully exercised when management wants to pass the proposals opposed by 
the ISS voting principles. Similarly, percent of employee ownership in firms’ equity 
market value in the results of close votes has a coefficient of 0.2062 percentage points, 
which implies that employee voting rights are more usefully garnered in management’s 
                                           
27 I do not include the logit analyses since employee ownership in DC plans are not statistically significant 
anymore. 
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favor when management can have influence on voting outcomes with a small shift. 
However, given that firms with higher employee ownership would be more likely to have 
ISS recommend against their proposals or have close votes, there would be selection 
effects in these subsample tests.  
Table 6 presents the relation between employee ownership in DC plans and voting 
support for shareholder sponsored proposals.28 Again, voting support for shareholder 
sponsored proposals can be interpreted as voting against management. As a result, I 
expect a negative relation between employee ownership in DC plans and voting 
outcomes. The first three columns display the OLS regression results while the last two 
columns provide the marginal effects of a Logit model of employee ownership on voting 
outcome. In model (1), the coefficient on employee ownership dummy is -2.2274, 
implying that voting support in favor of shareholder sponsored proposals decreases by 2 
percentage point on average. The other employee ownership measures also have negative 
signs, but they are statistically insignificant. The logit results in the right panel (in column 
(4) and (5)) show the marginal effect of employee ownership on voting outcomes for 
shareholder proposals. As predicted, the signs of both employee ownership measures are 
negative. However, they are not statistically significant.  
As expected, the coefficients of control variables are opposite to Table 6, except 
the ISS against dummy. This is because voting support in favor of management can be 
expressed with voting for management sponsored proposals and voting against 
shareholder sponsored proposals. ISS opposed shareholder sponsored proposals can be 
interpreted as those proposals in which ISS agrees with management while ISS 
recommend shareholder proposals can be interpreted as those proposals in which ISS 
opposes management. Therefore, employee ownership is more likely to be negatively 
associated with subsamples for shareholder proposals recommend by ISS. However, none 
of the employee ownership metrics is statistically significant. Firms protected with more 
                                           
28 The overall purpose of shareholder proposals on social issues differs from governance related proposals 
such as compensations and directors, and thus I exclude proposals categorized as social issues from the 
analyses. Given that the management opposes shareholder-sponsored proposals 99.6% of the time and there 
is no discontinuity in the distribution of voting outcomes in shareholder-sponsored proposal votes at the 50 
percent level, the arguments for subsample analyses with the ISS against votes and close votes are not valid 
in shareholder-sponsored proposals.  
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antitakeover defense provisions and firms with higher institutional holdings are more 
likely to oppose management by supporting shareholder proposals. Although shareholder 
sponsored proposals have non-binding votes, there is evidence that proposals supported 
by greater than 50% voting support are difficult for the board to ignore (Ertimur, Ferri, 
and Stubben, 2010). Thus, I conduct a similar test for subsamples for the shareholder 
proposals that received above 50% voting support, but none of employee ownership 
metrics is statistically significant. 
 
4.2. Employee Ownership and Voting Outcome by Proposal Types 
Due to the fact that more than 70% of management sponsored proposals fall in 
director election proposals, the results in Table 4 are largely driven by these proposals. 
Therefore, I conduct the same analyses separately for both management- and shareholder-
sponsored proposals related to the issue of directors and compensation: director election, 
director related, compensation related, and say on pay frequency proposals. These 
proposals are of particular interest given that they are the most common proposals and 
therefore provide enough observations for subsample tests. Also, I provide further 
explanations of subsample tests for each category below. 
First, I focus on director election proposals. Under plurality voting systems, 
shareholders have little impact on director elections. However, recent literature shows 
that although reduced shareholders’ voting support does not directly affect director 
election outcomes; it does lead to changes in board, management, and other governance 
related issues (Cai et al., 2009; Ertimur et al., 2013; Fischer et al., 2009; Yermack, 2010). 
Among director election proposals, I conduct the subsample analysis for proposals with 
less than 80% voting support. The logic behind this test is that managers are more likely 
to implement shareholder requests on governance change when shareholders give greater 
than 20% votes withheld from directors up for election (Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke, 
2008).  
The results of voting outcomes on director elections are shown in Table 7. The left 
panel contains the results of all director election proposals while the right panel shows 
the results of director election proposals with less than 80% shareholder “For” votes. 
Employee ownership metrics are statistically significant in all specifications. As more 
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than 70% of observations in Table 5 are director election proposals, the magnitudes of 
employee ownership on director elections in the left panel are similar to those of Table 4. 
However, the coefficients of all three metrics of employee ownership are over five times 
greater compared to the left panel. This result suggests that managers more usefully 
garner employee-voting rights of company stock in DC plans when there is significant 
dissatisfaction on a director up for election.  
Second, I choose director related proposals since issues such as “adopting 
majority voting for election of directors” and “approving changes in size of board” are 
important factors that exacerbate managerial entrenchment. Ertimur et al. (2013) examine 
the effect of a change in director voting system from plurality voting rules to majority 
voting rules and find 1.43-1.60% of abnormal returns on annual meeting dates when 
adopting majority of voting for director elections are voted upon.  
In Table 8, the left panel contains the results of director related management-
sponsored proposals while the right panel shows the results of director related 
shareholder-sponsored proposals. Employee ownership is positively associated with 
voting support for management proposals and negatively associated with voting support 
for shareholder proposals except in column (5). However, employee ownership metrics 
are only marginally significant in column (2) and (3). Compared to the results in Table 4 
and Table 6, the coefficients of employee ownership measures are mostly greater. 
Third, compensation related and say on pay frequency proposals are closely 
related to managerial entrenchment because they directly influence the economic welfare 
of the managers and management (Ashraf et al., 2010). Erimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2011) 
examine vote no campaigns and compensation related shareholder proposals during the 
period of 1997-2007 and document a $2.3 million reduction on CEO pay for firms with 
excess CEO pay and with institutional proponents submitting the pay design proposals. 
Cai and Walkling (2011) find that say on pay frequency proposals create value for firms 
that could benefit from improvement in compensation policy.  
Table 9 shows the results of compensated related management proposals in the 
left panel and those compensated related shareholder proposals in the right panel. 
Employee ownership dummy is only significant in column (1) for management proposals 
while percent of employee ownership in DC plans is only significant in column (5) for 
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shareholder sponsored proposals. Contrary to expectation, the impact of employee 
ownership on voting outcomes for these proposals is not significantly larger, compared to 
the results in Table 4 and Table 5. The results of say on pay frequency proposals are 
displayed in Table 10. Employee ownership metrics are significantly positive except 
percent of employee ownership in DC plans. The effect of employee ownership on voting 
outcomes of say on pay frequency proposals becomes significantly greater than the 
results of Table 4. Specifically, the coefficient of percent of employee ownership in firms’ 
equity market value is nine times larger than the results of all management proposals. 
With respect to the economic magnitude, an increase in the percent of employee 
ownership in firms’ equity market value by one standard deviation is associated with an 
increase in the proportion of “For” votes of 0.94 percentage points. Considering that 
$143,000 of abnormal CEO compensation is reduced from a 1 percentage point decrease 
in director votes, the economic magnitudes of 0.94 percentage points is not trivial. 
 
4.3. Employee Ownership, Voting Outcomes, and Corporate Governance  
I next examine the different effects of employee ownership in voting outcomes 
between firms with good governance and firms with bad governance. The OLS regression 
results estimated from equation (2) are shown in Table 11. I now add interaction terms 
between employee ownership and governance in the regression. To aid in interpreting the 
interaction terms, I use the employee ownership dummy as the main independent variable 
and interact it with one of the governance metrics. In the regression containing cases of 
all management sponsored proposals in the left panel, the interaction term between 
employee ownership dummy and all governance measures are not statistically significant.  
Like the results in Table 5, I expect that the effects of interaction terms are mostly 
higher for subsample tests with ISS opposed votes (in the middle panel) and with close 
votes (in the right panel). However, the interaction term with the Herfindahl-index is only 
statistically significant. As for the economic magnitude of the effects, an increase in the 
Herfindahl-index by one standard deviation is associated with an increase in “For” votes 
of 8.2859*0.19=1.57 percentage points.  
In most cases, the interaction terms are not statistically significant, however their 
signs are consistent with the hypotheses that the effect of employee ownership in DC 
 28 
plans on voting support for management is stronger in firms that have weaker governance 
mechanisms (higher entrenchment index, lower institutional ownership, lower industry 
competition) than firms that have better governance. Similar analyses are conducted for 
each type of proposals (unreported). I do not find significant effects for interaction terms 
for shareholder-sponsored proposals. 
 
4.4. Employee Ownership and Managerial Ownership   
As mentioned previously, the average percentage of firms’ equity market value 
held by employees in DC plans, 2.45%, may appear to be relatively small. However, once 
it is combined with managerial ownership, it accounts for 5.18%.29 In column (2) in 
Table 12 of the results for management sponsored proposals, the coefficient of the 
percent of employee and managerial ownership is 0.0813, and its economic magnitude is 
0.0813* 6.52=0.53 percentage points. Likewise, in column (5) of the results for 
shareholder sponsored proposals, percent of employee and managerial ownership reduce 
“For” votes by 0.4776*6.52=3.11 percentage points.  
 As shown in Table 4, managerial ownership is lower in firms with employee 
ownership than in firms without employee ownership. This suggests that mangers may 
use employee ownership as a substitute for managerial ownership. If so, the effect of 
employee ownership on voting outcomes would be higher in firms with lower managerial 
ownership. To gain more insight into the relationship between employee ownership and 
managerial ownership in voting outcomes, I examine the different effects of employee 
ownership in voting outcomes between firms with higher managerial ownership and 
firms with lower managerial ownership. To do this, I include interactions of percent of 
employee ownership in firms’ equity market value with the different levels of percent of 
managerial ownership (low, medium and high tertile). Column (3) shows that there is no 
employee ownership effect on voting outcomes for firms with the managerial ownership 
in all tertiles. In column (6) of the results for shareholder sponsored proposals, one 
percentage point of employee ownership drops “For” votes by 0.64 percentage points in 
                                           
29 Mitchell and Utkus (2002) show that percent of firm’s equity market value held by employees in DC plans 
for 65 of the largest DC plans is 5.9%, which they argue can be very influential in a tight takeover battle.  
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the medium tertile. Overall, the findings do not support the hypothesis that the effect of 
employee ownership on voting outcomes is higher in firms with lower managerial 
ownership.  
 
4.5. Two Stage Least Squares 
One possible concern with the specifications I adopt is that the relationship 
between employee ownership and voting outcomes could result in spurious correlations, 
caused by governance mechanisms that are used as control variables. For example, 
managers of firms with higher entrenchment index values have greater control relative to 
shareholders, and thus they are more likely to increase the fraction of employee DC 
holdings invested in company stock. At the same time, these managers are less likely to 
propose shareholder friendly proposals, leading to lower voting support in favor of 
management. To mitigate this issue, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis is 
conducted. The instrumental variables in the first stage should be highly correlated with 
employee ownership while they must not determine voting outcomes.  
I begin with regressing the three metrics of employee ownership on variables 
considered as possible motivations for management to encourage company stock in DC 
plans, such as tax, cash, union, and defined benefit plans, mentioned in Chapter 2.  
Among these variables, I exclude firm characteristics (proxies for improving 
productivity) and governance mechanisms since they determine voting outcomes. 
Further, I exclude the variables that proxies for tax and union because they are not 
correlated with employee ownership once exogenous variables (control variables in 
voting outcomes) have been netted out. This leads to using proxies for cash and defined 
benefit plans as instrumental variables.  
In the first stage, I estimate the equation of the determinants of employee 
ownership from instrumental variables including interest burden (proxy for cash saving 
motive), cash flow shortfall (proxy for cash saving motive), DB plan without company 
stock (proxy for existence of other retirement plans), and DB plan with company stock 
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(proxy for existence of other retirement plans), and from industry and year dummies.30 I 
then obtain the estimated values of employee ownership. Table 13 presents the results of 
2SLS for management sponsored proposals.31 The results of the first stage are shown in 
columns (1), (3), and (5). These instrumental variables are statistically significant except 
in column (3). The F statistics for endogeneity imply that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between the error terms in the second stage and instrumental 
variables.32 The results suggest that the 2SLS model is properly identified. The adjusted 
R2 of the first stage regression ranges as high as 0.2. In the second stage, I use these 
estimated values of employee ownership in the regression of voting outcomes. The 
results are shown in columns (2), (4), and (6). The effects of the three metrics of 
employee ownership are much stronger than the results with OLS in Table 4. For 
example, an increase in percent employee ownership in firms’ equity market value of one 
standard deviation is associated with an increase in the proportion of “For” votes of 
0.4115*2.45=1.01 percentage points. I conduct the similar tests for shareholder sponsored 
proposals as well. However, none of the instrumental variables are significant, and the 
reported adjusted R2 is very low. Further, I cannot reject the null the hypothesis of F 
statistics for endogeneity.  
                                           
30 Interest burden is defined as the interest expense scaled by operating income before depreciation; cash 
flow shortfall is defined as cash flow used for investment plus dividends less cash flow from operations, 
scaled by total assets; dividend yield is dividend scaled by the fiscal year closing stock price; a company is 
categorized as having a DB plan without company stock if all DB plans do not include company stock; a 
company is categorized as having a DB plan with company stock if at least one DB plan includes company 
stock. I average Interest burden, cash flow shortfall, and dividend yield over three years and then winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
31 None of these instrumental variables used in management-sponsored proposals reject the endogeneity of 
employee ownership in shareholder-sponsored proposals.    
 
32 I implement a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of the endogeneity of regressors. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The huge drop in stock prices of firms at which employees have a large fraction of 
DC holdings invested in company stock such as Enron lead to debates on inclusion of 
company stock in the menu of investment options in DC plans. Given the fact that many 
DC plans are combined with profit sharing features, stock bonus features, or ESOP 
features, managers of firms offering employee ownership can justify this behavior by 
arguing that employee ownership enhances productivity and enjoys tax benefits. 
However, these explanations have little empirical support.    
This paper considers whether firms’ decisions to offer company stock in DC plans 
are motivated by the managers’ desires to increase managerial power. Using a large 
sample of the proxy voting data from 2003 to 2012, I find that firms with DC holdings 
invested in company stock have higher levels of voting support for management 
proposals. This result suggests that managers provide employee ownership through DC 
plans to receive higher voting support in favor of management.  
The effects of company stock in DC plans become stronger in subsample tests 
with management proposals opposed by ISS and with close votes. This is the time when 
the employee vote might be more important to management. The subsamples tests with 
director election votes receiving more than 20% votes withheld also show the greater 
effects of employee ownership on voting outcomes. This is because managers are more 
likely to implement shareholder requests on governance change when shareholders give 
greater than 20% votes withheld from directors up for election. Finally, the subsample 
tests with say on pay frequency proposals provide significantly larger effects of employee 
ownership on voting outcomes. These proposals are closely related to managerial 
entrenchment because they directly influence the economic welfare of the managers and 
management. Specifically, in Say on pay frequency proposals, an increase in the percent 
of employee ownership in firms’ equity market value by one standard deviation is 
associated with an increase in the proportion of “For” votes of 0.94 percentage points. 
Considering that Cai et al. (2009) find that a 1% decrease in the average votes for 
compensation committee members associates with reductions in abnormal CEO 
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compensation by $143,000 in the following year, the effects of employee ownership are 
economically meaningful.   
If company stock in DC plans is used as a motive for managers’ control, I expect 
that the effect of employee ownership in voting outcomes will be larger for firms with 
poor governance. Using interaction terms between employee ownership and governance 
metrics, I find that the presence of good governance mechanisms mitigates the positive 
effect of employee ownership in voting support for management while the presence of 
bad governance mechanisms aggravates the positive effect of employee ownership. 
However, the effects are only weakly significant. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Employee Ownership in Defined Contribution (DC) Plans by Year 
 
No. firms 
in sample 
No. firms with 
nonzero DC 
employee ownership 
% of firms with 
nonzero DC employee 
ownership 
% of employee ownership in 
DC plans (nonzero 
employee ownership only) 
% of employee ownership in firms’ 
equity market value (nonzero 
employee ownership only) 
Year Count Count Ratio (%) Mean (%) Mean (%) 
Panel A: Full Form 5500 sample 
2002 3,019 1,325 43.9 30.4 3.2 
2003 3,039 1,335 43.9 30.3 3.0 
2004 3,018 1,309 43.4 28.5 2.6 
2005 2,967 1,313 44.3 27.2 2.4 
2006 2,942 1,280 43.5 26.1 2.1 
2007 2,830 1,199 42.4 24.1 1.9 
2008 2,742 1,129 41.2 22.4 2.0 
2009 2,894 1,152 39.8 22.0 2.0 
2010 2,765 1,113 40.3 22.3 1.9 
2011 2,618 1,039 39.7 20.9 1.8 
Total 28,834 12,194 42.3 25.7 2.3 
Panel B: Final sample 
2002 785 431 54.9 26.4 3.4 
2003 870 487 56.0 26.1 3.1 
2004 998 572 57.3 25.4 2.8 
2005 998 568 56.9 23.9 2.6 
2006 972 555 57.1 22.4 2.3 
2007 1,004 568 56.6 19.6 2.0 
2008 1,083 583 53.8 18.7 2.1 
2009 1,102 588 53.4 18.3 2.1 
2010 1,127 586 52.0 17.9 2.0 
2011 1,135 566 49.9 17.2 1.9 
Total 10,093 5,504 54.5 21.3 2.4 
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Summary statistics over time for the employee ownership variables in the full Form 5500 sample (Panel A) and final sample (Panel B). I obtain the number of 
firms with employee ownership in DC plans, the value of DC employee ownership, and the total DC assets from the Form 5500. The first two columns report the 
total number of firms in the sample and the total number of firms with non-zero employee ownership in DC plans only. The third column provides the percentage 
of firms with non-zero DC ownership in the sample. The fifth column presents the percentage of employee holdings invested in DC plans, and the final column 
reports the percentage of a firm’s equity market value that employees hold through DC plans. 
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Table 2  
Frequency and Percentage Support for Proposals by Categories 
 
All firms 
Firms without employee 
ownership 
Firms with employee 
ownership 
Category Freq.(%) Obs Mean(%) Obs Mean(%) Obs Mean(%) 
Panel A. Management proposals        
Director elections 75.2 52,390 94.6 23,469 94.4 28,921 94.7 
  with Majority voting rules 17.5 12,664 95.9 5,318 95.9 7,346 95.9 
  with Plurality voting rules 54.7 39,726 94.2 18,151 94.0 21,575 94.4 
Director related (except director elections) 0.8 592 85.9 224 86.2 368 85.7 
Compensation related 11.0 8,004 86.3 3,813 85.7 4,191 86.9 
Say on pay frequency 1.5 1,073 71.9 513 70.9 560  72.8 
Antitakeover related 0.6 406 80.0 181 79.0 225 80.8 
Routine/Business related 12.5 9,080 97.5 4,208 97.7 4,872  97.3 
Capitalization related 0.9 654 79.0 280 78.5 374 79.4 
Reorganization and Mergers related 0.3 227 83.0 99  83.4 128 82.7 
Others 0.2 134 83.0 53 80.2 81 85.0 
Total 100.0 72,560 93.4 32,840 93.1 39720 93.6 
Panel B. Shareholder proposals        
Director related 26.9 1,193 52.3 495 54.0 698 51.1 
Compensation related 21.1 936 29.2 344 29.7 592 29.0 
Corporate governance related 8.5 376 52.4 181 52.4 195 52.3 
Routine/Business related 6.7 299 29.0 98 30.7 201 28.1 
Miscellaneous 14.8 656 20.5 239 20.1 417 20.7 
Social issues 20.2 897 12.7 326 11.5 571 13.4 
Others 1.8 79 42.3 35 41.6 44 42.8 
Total 100.0 4,436 33.0 1,718 34.6 2718 32.0 
Frequency and percentage voting support for proposals by categories of all sample firms, firms without employee ownership in DC plans, and firms with 
employee ownership in DC plans. The sample consists of all management sponsored proposals in Panel A and all shareholder sponsored proposals in Panel B. I 
obtain the data on aggregate voting outcomes of the period 2003-2012 from ISS Voting Analytics. For each proposal type, the number of proposals and the 
average level of voting support are reported. I compute the level of voting support by dividing the total number of shares voted for by their base which serves as 
the dominator of the calculation of voting support rate. The three types of bases are total number of “For” and “Against” votes, total number of “For”, 
“Against”, and “Abstain” votes, and total number of outstanding shares eligible for a vote.  
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Table 3 
Sample Firm Characteristics  
 
All firms 
Firms without employee 
ownership 
Firms with employee 
ownership 
Difference 
between  
(3) and (5) 
 Mean 
(1) 
SD 
(2) 
Mean 
(3) 
SD 
(4) 
Mean 
(5) 
SD 
(6) 
T-stat 
(7) 
Employee ownership measures        
   Employee ownership dummy 0.55  0  1.00   
   % of employee ownership in DC plans 11.66 19.08 0  21.38 19.97 -79.43*** 
   % of employee ownership in equity market 
value 
1.31 2.45 0  2.40 2.89 -61.62*** 
        
Governance measures        
   E-index 2.53 1.34 2.36 1.32 2.68 1.34 -12.23*** 
   % of institutional ownership 77.89 17.55 80.27 17.35 75.89 17.47 12.59*** 
   Herfindahl index 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.18 -4.09*** 
        
Control variables affecting votes        
   % of managerial ownership 2.94 6.18 3.18 6.54 2.78 5.85 3.53*** 
   Market capitalization 21.56 1.50 21.42 1.53 21.68 1.47 -9.40*** 
   Market to book 1.84 1.02 1.97 1.09 1.73 0.94 11.76*** 
   Past performance 0.08 0.38 0.10 0.41 0.07 0.35 2.66** 
   ISS against dummy 0.09  0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29  
   Confidential voting dummy 0.13  0.12 0.32 0.15 0.35  
   Majority voting dummy 0.16  0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38  
Observations 10,093  4,589  5,504   
Sample firm characteristics. The sample of 72,560 management sponsored proposals and 4,436 shareholder sponsored proposals corresponds to 10,093firm-year 
observation. I obtain pension data from Form 5500, governance data from RiskMetrics, institutional holding data from Thomson Financial’s CDA/Spectrum, 
managerial ownership data from Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp, and financial data from Compustat and CRSP. All variables are defined in the Table A2 in the 
Appendix. I winsorized all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to avoid outliers. 
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Table 4 
Employee Ownership in DC Plans and Voting Support (All Management Proposals)  
 OLS Logit 
 % of voting support  % of voting support  % of voting support  Pass/fail Pass/fail 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Employee ownership dummy 0.4953***   0.0011*  
 (0.1473)   (0.0007)  
% of employee ownership in DC Plans  0.0080**    
  (0.0038)    
% of employee ownership in equity market 
value 
  0.0401*  0.0003* 
   (0.0241)  (0.0002) 
% of managerial ownership 0.0871*** 0.0869*** 0.0872*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
E-index -0.3395*** -0.3277*** -0.3223*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0571) (0.0571) (0.0572) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
% of institutional ownership -0.0150*** -0.0143*** -0.0151*** -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Herfindahl-index -0.4157 -0.3658 -0.3754 0.0013 0.0013 
 (0.4668) (0.4713) (0.4707) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
ISS against dummy -25.0101*** -25.0047*** -25.0016*** -0.0182*** -0.0182*** 
 (0.5597) (0.5596) (0.5593) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Confidential voting dummy -0.4047** -0.3923** -0.4072** -0.0020** -0.0021** 
 (0.1748) (0.1769) (0.1766) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Majority voting dummy 0.1648 0.1848 0.1723 0.0003 0.0003 
 (0.1366) (0.1380) (0.1370) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Market capitalization 0.1486** 0.1430** 0.1566** 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0622) (0.0641) (0.0621) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Market to book 0.3086*** 0.2887*** 0.3005*** 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.0759) (0.0751) (0.0760) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Past performance 0.2664** 0.2536** 0.2563** 0.0015** 0.0015** 
 (0.1282) (0.1288) (0.1288) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
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Table 4 (continued).  
 OLS Logit 
 % of voting support  % of voting support  % of voting support  Pass/fail Pass/fail 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Director elections(M) 10.8356*** 10.7957*** 10.8148*** 0.0232*** 0.0233*** 
 (1.7956) (1.8223) (1.8260) (0.0032) (0.0032) 
Director related(M) 1.4444 1.3886 1.4180 -0.0056** -0.0056** 
 (1.8764) (1.9015) (1.9054) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Compensation related(M) 3.8717** 3.8276** 3.8456** 0.0087*** 0.0088*** 
 (1.7928) (1.8193) (1.8231) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Say on pay frequency(M) -5.3695*** -5.4147*** -5.3959*** -0.0034 -0.0033 
 (1.8402) (1.8657) (1.8694) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Antitakeover related(M) -2.5912 -2.6441 -2.6301 -0.0053 -0.0053 
 (1.9501) (1.9753) (1.9785) (0.0033) (0.0032) 
Routine/Business related(M) 12.5313*** 12.4846*** 12.5010*** 0.0079*** 0.0080*** 
 (1.7862) (1.8130) (1.8169) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Capitalization related(M) -3.7503* -3.7980* -3.7774* 0.0014 0.0015 
 (1.9683) (1.9935) (1.9968) (0.0030) (0.0029) 
Reorganization and Mergers related(M) -1.2915 -1.3296 -1.3110 0.0011 0.0013 
 (2.0310) (2.0529) (2.0562) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
      
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 72560 72560 72560 72513 72513 
R-squared 0.5850 0.5847 0.5846   
Pseudo r-squared    0.6307 0.6309 
Results relating voting support and employee ownership in DC plans. The sample includes all management sponsored proposals. I estimate ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions from the equation (1) in columns (1)-(3). The dependent variable is the percentage of “For” votes on proposals. The marginal effects of logit 
analyses are reported in column (4)-(5). The dependent variable is equal to one if the proposal is passed, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 
A2 in the Appendix. All specifications are estimated with year dummies and Fama-French 12 industry dummies but not reported. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered at firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except the E-index. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Employee Ownership in DC Plans and Voting Support (ISS Opposed Management Proposals only and Management Proposals with Close Votes only) 
 ISS opposed votes only Close votes only 
 % of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employee ownership dummy 1.6019**   1.4874***   
 (0.9555)   (0.4420)   
% of employee ownership in DC Plans  0.0082   0.0071  
  (0.0237)   (0.0129)  
% of employee ownership in equity market 
value 
  0.0911**   0.2062** 
   (0.1521)   (0.0903) 
% of managerial ownership 0.3390*** 0.3376*** 0.3388*** 0.0658* 0.0709* 0.0747* 
 (0.0677) (0.0670) (0.0668) (0.0389) (0.0392) (0.0387) 
E-index -1.5813*** -1.5293*** -1.5375*** -0.2421 -0.1748 -0.2051 
 (0.3784) (0.3761) (0.3722) (0.1839) (0.1850) (0.1845) 
% of institutional ownership -0.1744*** -0.1749*** -0.1750*** -0.0737*** -0.0740*** -0.0712*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0146) 
Herfindahl-index -0.2073 -0.0798 -0.1060 1.1193 1.3680 1.3678 
 (2.8743) (2.8975) (2.8874) (1.5842) (1.6290) (1.6160) 
ISS against dummy    -6.5207*** -6.4136*** -6.4886*** 
    (0.4751) (0.4802) (0.4812) 
Confidential voting dummy -0.6264 -0.7482 -0.7460 0.0720 0.0909 0.0728 
 (1.1136) (1.0966) (1.0985) (0.5439) (0.5425) (0.5404) 
Majority voting dummy -0.4142 -0.2761 -0.2961 0.3222 0.3432 0.3130 
 (1.1080) (1.1218) (1.1204) (0.5414) (0.5378) (0.5372) 
Market capitalization 0.7641** 0.7763** 0.7857** 0.6730*** 0.6959*** 0.7016*** 
 (0.3323) (0.3347) (0.3278) (0.1500) (0.1534) (0.1506) 
Market to book -0.0834 -0.1064 -0.0852 0.1011 0.0847 0.1164 
 (0.4876) (0.4789) (0.4869) (0.2258) (0.2283) (0.2286) 
Past performance -0.7680 -0.8388 -0.8277 0.3767 0.2626 0.2869 
 (0.7222) (0.7250) (0.7248) (0.4973) (0.4981) (0.4952) 
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Table 5. (continued).  
 ISS opposed votes only Close votes only 
 % of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Director elections(M) 15.5493*** 15.8626*** 15.8651*** 9.7239*** 9.7065*** 9.7269*** 
 (4.1757) (4.0938) (4.1012) (2.3400) (2.3170) (2.3293) 
Director related(M) -0.9371 -0.5523 -0.4992 2.2631 2.2256 2.2567 
 (8.4230) (8.3770) (8.3457) (2.7538) (2.7378) (2.7532) 
Compensation related(M) 8.3356** 8.5921** 8.5973** 7.7470*** 7.7433*** 7.7696*** 
 (4.1753) (4.0969) (4.1037) (2.3564) (2.3304) (2.3449) 
Say on pay frequency(M) -14.5328*** -14.3039*** -14.2833*** -6.7221*** -6.7455*** -6.7069*** 
 (4.2699) (4.1962) (4.2001) (2.4206) (2.3930) (2.4099) 
Antitakeover related(M) 1.9813 2.2865 2.2271 3.6954 3.6923 3.5908 
 (5.0131) (4.9638) (4.9729) (2.7588) (2.7364) (2.7461) 
Routine/Business related(M) 8.2789* 8.6597* 8.6386* 4.5724* 4.7168* 4.6218* 
 (4.6528) (4.5759) (4.5750) (2.5916) (2.5772) (2.5930) 
Capitalization related(M) 3.2142 3.6012 3.6091 5.4516** 5.4147** 5.4286** 
 (4.6319) (4.5649) (4.5582) (2.4554) (2.4234) (2.4388) 
Reorganization and Mergers related(M) -3.4177 -3.0557 -3.0381 6.0779** 5.9849** 6.0759** 
 (8.5964) (8.4856) (8.4730) (2.7471) (2.6974) (2.7130) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5219 5219 5219 3062 3062 3062 
R-squared 0.4068 0.4049 0.4049 0.3010 0.2958 0.2974 
Results relating voting support and employee ownership in DC plans. The left panel presents the results from the subsample where ISS opposed management 
proposals, and the right panel shows the results from the subsample with close votes that have 30% to 60% of voting support. I estimate ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions from the equation (1). The dependent variable is the percentage of “For” votes on proposals. All other variables are defined in Table A2 in the 
Appendix. All specifications are estimated with year dummies and Fama-French 12 industry dummies but not reported. Standard errors reported in parentheses 
are clustered at firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except the E-index. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Employee Ownership in DC Plans and Voting Support (All Shareholder Proposals) 
 OLS Logit 
 % of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
Pass/fail Pass/fail 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Employee ownership dummy -2.2274*   -0.0253  
 (1.2637)   (0.0218)  
% of employee ownership in DC Plans  -0.0085    
  (0.0266)    
% of employee ownership in equity market 
value 
  -0.3164  -0.0057 
   (0.2009)  (0.0040) 
% of managerial ownership -0.5113*** -0.5256*** -0.5335*** -0.0078*** -0.0081*** 
 (0.1617) (0.1623) (0.1646) (0.0026) (0.0027) 
E-index 1.2234** 1.1596** 1.2107** 0.0282*** 0.0283*** 
 (0.5307) (0.5355) (0.5260) (0.0097) (0.0097) 
% of institutional ownership 0.1453*** 0.1423** 0.1366** 0.0028*** 0.0026*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0561) (0.0539) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Herfindahl-index -0.2424 -0.1615 -0.2579 -0.0214 -0.0181 
 (3.5075) (3.5152) (3.4455) (0.0713) (0.0720) 
ISS against dummy -27.4073*** -27.3894*** -27.4305*** -0.4590*** -0.4594*** 
 (0.8660) (0.8569) (0.8658) (0.0558) (0.0557) 
Confidential voting dummy -0.4492 -0.3400 -0.3547 -0.0084 -0.0085 
 (1.2540) (1.2852) (1.2756) (0.0234) (0.0234) 
Majority voting dummy -3.6968*** -3.6988*** -3.7007*** -0.0160 -0.0163 
 (1.4152) (1.4174) (1.4166) (0.0237) (0.0236) 
Market capitalization -2.2287*** -2.2232*** -2.2750*** -0.0356*** -0.0364*** 
 (0.5023) (0.5082) (0.5055) (0.0088) (0.0088) 
Market to book 0.4707 0.5364 0.4587 -0.0009 -0.0012 
 (0.6387) (0.6611) (0.6594) (0.0122) (0.0123) 
Past performance 1.4783 1.6192 1.6195 0.0255 0.0270 
 (1.5536) (1.5736) (1.5631) (0.0244) (0.0244) 
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Table 6. (continued). 
 OLS Logit 
 % of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
Pass/fail Pass/fail 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Director related(S) 9.1551*** 9.2345*** 9.1980*** 0.0754 0.0759 
 (2.1399) (2.1263) (2.1277) (0.0483) (0.0478) 
Compensation related(S) -4.1345** -4.1895** -4.2020** -0.1582*** -0.1591*** 
 (1.8665) (1.8407) (1.8487) (0.0479) (0.0474) 
Corporate governance related(S) 11.9813*** 12.1514*** 12.0679*** 0.1775*** 0.1783*** 
 (2.0267) (2.0235) (2.0243) (0.0472) (0.0468) 
Routine/Business related(S) -4.2339** -4.3270** -4.3106** -0.2866*** -0.2871*** 
 (1.9373) (1.9181) (1.9251) (0.0614) (0.0609) 
      
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2883 2883 2883 2875 2875 
R-squared 0.5590 0.5573 0.5582   
Pseudo r-squared    0.5590 0.5582 
Results relating voting support and employee ownership in DC plans. The sample includes shareholder sponsored proposals. I estimate ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions from the equation (1) in columns (1)-(3). The dependent variable is the percentage of “For” votes on proposals. The marginal effects of logit 
analyses are reported in columns (4)-(5). The dependent variable is equal to one if the proposal is passed, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 
A2 in the Appendix. All specifications are estimated with year dummies and Fama-French 12 industry dummies but not reported. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered at firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except the E-index. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Employee Ownership in DC Plans and Voting Support (Director Election Proposals and Director Election Proposals with 20% withheld Votes only) 
 All director election proposals Director election proposals with 20% withheld votes 
only 
 % of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employee ownership dummy 0.4515***   2.4971***   
 (0.1624)   (0.7005)   
% of employee ownership in DC Plans  0.0090**   0.0484**  
  (0.0043)   (0.0233)  
% of employee ownership in equity market 
value 
  0.0388*   0.3689** 
   (0.0270)   (0.1529) 
% of managerial ownership 0.0655*** 0.0653*** 0.0655*** -0.0427 -0.0406 -0.0321 
 (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0543) (0.0555) (0.0569) 
E-index -0.3312*** -0.3236*** -0.3165*** -0.2370 -0.2069 -0.2140 
 (0.0628) (0.0625) (0.0623) (0.2907) (0.2877) (0.2888) 
% of institutional ownership -0.0140*** -0.0131** -0.0141*** -0.1195*** -0.1139*** -0.1166*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0216) (0.0224) (0.0220) 
Herfindahl-index -0.6301 -0.5827 -0.5908 4.0893* 4.4846* 4.3463* 
 (0.5172) (0.5213) (0.5203) (2.3209) (2.3434) (2.3067) 
ISS against dummy -23.5127*** -23.5041*** -23.5012*** -8.8261*** -8.6726*** -8.6193*** 
 (0.6683) (0.6678) (0.6677) (0.7944) (0.8155) (0.8386) 
Confidential voting dummy -0.2841 -0.2713 -0.2845 1.8866** 1.7418** 1.8166** 
 (0.1818) (0.1836) (0.1832) (0.8336) (0.8076) (0.8333) 
Majority voting dummy 0.4797*** 0.5000*** 0.4867*** 2.7288*** 2.8646*** 2.8095*** 
 (0.1455) (0.1465) (0.1460) (0.8435) (0.8428) (0.8617) 
Market capitalization 0.1611** 0.1528** 0.1675** 0.4438* 0.4191 0.4586* 
 (0.0653) (0.0673) (0.0652) (0.2426) (0.2549) (0.2557) 
Market to book 0.3469*** 0.3281*** 0.3410*** 0.1934 0.1422 0.2353 
 (0.0859) (0.0849) (0.0856) (0.4110) (0.3986) (0.3962) 
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Table 7. (continued).  
 All director election proposals Director election proposals with 20% withheld votes 
only 
 % of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
% of voting 
support  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Past performance 0.1658 0.1540 0.1606** -0.4442 -0.6405 -0.5735 
 (0.1541) (0.1545) (0.0737) (0.4553) (0.4560) (0.4572) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 52390 52390 52390 3188 3188 3188 
R-squared 0.5600 0.5596 0.5594 0.1898 0.1817 0.1817 
Results relating voting support and employee ownership in DC plans. The left panel contains the results of all director election proposals, and the right panel 
shows the results of director election proposals with less than 80% shareholder “For” votes. I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions from the equation 
(1). The dependent variable is the percentage of “For” votes on proposals. All other variables are defined in Table A2 in the Appendix. All specifications are 
estimated with year dummies and Fama-French 12 industry dummies but not reported. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at firm level. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except the E-index. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8  
Employee Ownership in DC Plans and Voting Support (Director Related Management Proposals and Director Related Shareholder Proposals only) 
 Director related management proposals only Director related shareholder proposals only 
 % of voting 
support  
(1) 
% of voting 
support 
 (2) 
% of voting 
support  
(3) 
% of voting 
support  
(4) 
% of voting 
support  
(5) 
% of voting 
support 
 (6) 
Employee ownership dummy 0.3655   -2.9451   
 (1.1618)   (2.0672)   
% of employee ownership in DC Plans  0.0396*   0.0033  
  (0.0229)   (0.0488)  
% of employee ownership in equity market 
value 
  0.2821*   -0.3819 
   (0.1663)   (0.3690) 
% of managerial ownership 0.1941* 0.1929* 0.2060* -0.3418 -0.3747 -0.3826 
 (0.1094) (0.1141) (0.1154) (0.2766) (0.2799) (0.2832) 
E-index 0.3341 0.3458 0.3433 1.0761 1.0269 1.0698 
 (0.5137) (0.5046) (0.5038) (0.8559) (0.8656) (0.8608) 
% of institutional ownership 0.0000 0.0118 0.0093 0.2682*** 0.2692*** 0.2580*** 
 (0.0459) (0.0493) (0.0470) (0.0691) (0.0769) (0.0735) 
Herfindahl-index 1.0429 0.9472 0.6952 2.4466 1.8490 2.0000 
 (3.4839) (3.4485) (3.4595) (6.4734) (6.4823) (6.4325) 
ISS against dummy -29.1370*** -29.0743*** -28.8815*** -31.5761*** -31.5221*** -31.6129*** 
 (7.3948) (7.4574) (7.4072) (2.0756) (2.0378) (2.0675) 
Confidential voting dummy -0.7847 -0.5328 -0.7152 0.3380 0.5331 0.3965 
 (1.6104) (1.5673) (1.5757) (2.1808) (2.2557) (2.2205) 
Majority voting dummy -1.8154 -1.8613 -1.9869 -6.0572*** -6.1635*** -6.1182*** 
 (1.5069) (1.5003) (1.5172) (2.2366) (2.2318) (2.2328) 
Market capitalization -1.1905*** -1.2192*** -1.1681*** -3.7966*** -3.7710*** -3.8217*** 
 (0.3876) (0.3823) (0.3887) (0.7417) (0.7565) (0.7519) 
Market to book 2.1148*** 1.9336*** 2.1210*** 0.8138 0.8870 0.8227 
 (0.6043) (0.6017) (0.6028) (0.8664) (0.9002) (0.9122) 
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Table 8. (continued).  
 Director related management proposals only Director related shareholder proposals only 
 % of voting 
support 
(1) 
% of voting 
support 
(2) 
% of voting 
support 
(3) 
% of voting 
support 
(4) 
% of voting 
support 
(5) 
% of voting 
support 
(6) 
Past performance -2.6559 -2.8784 -2.8901 1.4801 1.6978 1.6721 
 (1.9651) (1.9510) (1.9559) (1.8349) (1.8288) (1.8153) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 592 592 592 1193 1193 1193 
R-squared 0.2470 0.2506 0.2499 0.4541 0.4512 0.4526 
Results relating voting support and employee ownership in DC plans. The left panel presents the results of director related management sponsored proposals, and 
the right panel presents the results of director related shareholder sponsored proposals. I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions from the equation (1). 
The dependent variable is the percentage of “For” votes on proposals. All other variables are defined in Table A2 in the Appendix. All specifications are 
estimated with year dummies and Fama-French 12 industry dummies but not reported. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at firm level. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except the E-index. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9 
Employee Ownership in DC Plans and Voting Support (Compensation Related Management and Compensation related shareholder Proposals only) 
 Compensation related management proposals only Compensation related shareholder proposals only 
 % of voting 
support  
(1) 
% of voting 
support  
(2) 
% of voting 
support  
(3) 
% of voting 
support  
(4) 
% of voting 
support  
(5) 
% of voting 
support  
(6) 
Employee ownership dummy 0.9778***   -1.1907   
 (0.3269)   (1.0340)   
% of employee ownership in DC Plans  0.0132   -0.0373*  
  (0.0091)   (0.0216)  
% of employee ownership in equity market value   0.0747   -0.1303 
   (0.0650)   (0.1737) 
% of managerial ownership 0.1951*** 0.1939*** 0.1947*** -0.4006*** -0.4106*** -0.4142*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0980) (0.0967) (0.0963) 
E-index -0.4582*** -0.4306*** -0.4198*** 1.2741*** 1.2746*** 1.2311*** 
 (0.1398) (0.1413) (0.1407) (0.3492) (0.3498) (0.3500) 
% of institutional ownership -0.0482*** -0.0476*** -0.0485*** 0.0264 0.0154 0.0235 
 (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0471) (0.0483) (0.0484) 
Herfindahl-index -0.3809 -0.2939 -0.3331 -5.9263** -5.7656** -5.7547** 
 (1.0470) (1.0433) (1.0446) (2.8955) (2.8086) (2.8839) 
ISS against dummy -24.7205*** -24.7303*** -24.7302*** -28.6001*** -28.5915*** -28.6178*** 
 (0.6309) (0.6292) (0.6286) (0.9310) (0.9225) (0.9213) 
Confidential voting dummy -1.3294*** -1.2982*** -1.3339*** -1.3264 -1.2479 -1.2619 
 (0.4307) (0.4300) (0.4310) (0.9326) (0.9182) (0.9371) 
Majority voting dummy -1.2025*** -1.1672*** -1.1886*** 1.4540 1.4128 1.5164 
 (0.3687) (0.3705) (0.3694) (1.1028) (1.1007) (1.1022) 
Market capitalization 0.4485*** 0.4456*** 0.4698*** 0.0782 0.1439 0.0278 
 (0.1387) (0.1411) (0.1383) (0.4581) (0.4605) (0.4544) 
Market to book 0.4321*** 0.3915** 0.4093** -0.4971 -0.3573 -0.4899 
 (0.1664) (0.1660) (0.1668) (0.5498) (0.5587) (0.5546) 
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Table 9. (continued).  
 Compensation related management proposals only Compensation related shareholder proposals only 
 % of voting 
support 
(1) 
% of voting 
support 
(2) 
% of voting 
support 
(3) 
% of voting 
support 
(4) 
% of voting 
support 
(5) 
% of voting 
support 
(6) 
Past performance 1.1095*** 1.0876*** 1.0859*** 1.0786 1.1214 1.1492 
 (0.2802) (0.2788) (0.2787) (1.2552) (1.2390) (1.2361) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8004 8004 8004 936 936 936 
R-squared 0.4206 0.4196 0.4195 0.6721 0.6726 0.6715 
Results relating voting support and employee ownership in DC plans. The left panel presents the results of compensation related management sponsored 
proposals, and the right panel presents the results of compensation related shareholder sponsored proposals. I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
from the equation (1). The dependent variable is the percentage of “For” votes on proposals. All other variables are defined in Table A2 in the Appendix. All 
specifications are estimated with year dummies and Fama-French 12 industry dummies but not reported. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at 
firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except the E-index. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Employee Ownership in DC Plans and Voting Support (Say on Pay Frequency Proposals only) 
 % of voting support 
(1) 
% of voting support 
(2) 
% of voting support 
(3) 
Employee ownership dummy 1.5386** (0.7742)   
    
% of employee ownership in DC Plans  0.0235 (0.0236)  
    
% of employee ownership in equity market value   0.3841** (0.1668) 
    
% of managerial ownership 0.4729*** (0.1325) 0.4686*** (0.1326) 0.4721*** (0.1324) 
    
E-index -1.2016*** (0.4061) -1.1631*** (0.4020) -1.0906*** (0.3983) 
    
% of institutional ownership -0.0993*** (0.0327) -0.0986*** (0.0332) -0.0952** (0.0329) 
    
Herfindahl-index 3.3196 (2.1724) 3.4922 (2.1799) 3.4194 (2.1769) 
    
ISS against dummy -47.3834*** (0.9406) -47.4572*** (0.9401) -47.4436*** (0.9312) 
    
Confidential voting dummy -2.2178*** (0.8270) -2.1738*** (0.8346) -2.2608*** (0.8515) 
    
Majority voting dummy -1.0975 (0.8147) -1.0262 (0.8251) -1.0825 (0.8168) 
    
Market capitalization 0.1047 (0.3147) 0.0981 (0.3184) 0.1324 (0.3111) 
    
Market to book -0.3215 (0.4209) -0.4030 (0.4148) -0.3440 (0.4183) 
    
Past performance 1.0936 (0.8583) 1.0574 (0.8617) 1.0612 (0.8542) 
    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1073 1073 1073 
R-squared 0.7987 0.7981 0.7986 
Results relating voting support and employee ownership in DC plans. The sample includes Say on pay frequency proposals. I estimate ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions from the equation (1). The dependent variable is the percentage of “For” votes on proposals. All specifications are estimated with year 
dummies and Fama-French 12 industry dummies but not reported. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at firm level. All other variables are 
defined in Table A2 in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except the E-index. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 11 
Employee ownership in DC plans, voting support, and governance (Management sponsored proposals) 
 % of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Employee ownership 
dummy  
0.5153*** 1.2667* 0.3499* 1.0799 0.1637 -0.2041 1.4851*** -1.6987 0.9989 
 (0.1766) (0.6709) (0.2090) (1.1755) (3.3214) (1.2549) (0.5341) (2.1120) (0.6274) 
Employee ownership 
dummy  
-0.0491   1.1800   0.0045   
* E-index (0.1743)   (1.1474)   (0.7235)   
Employee ownership 
dummy 
 -0.0097   0.0183   0.0393  
* % of institutional 
ownership 
 (0.0081)   (0.0435)   (0.0265)  
Employee ownership 
dummy 
  0.7394   8.2859*   2.4798 
* Herfindahl-index   (0.7966)   (4.3164)   (2.5281) 
E-index 0.0872*** 0.0875*** 0.0870*** 0.3386*** 0.3372*** 0.3394*** 0.0658* 0.0668* 0.0640* 
 (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0673) (0.0670) (0.0666) (0.0390) (0.0383) (0.0389) 
% of institutional ownership -0.3307*** -0.3396*** -0.3390*** -1.7831*** -1.5742*** -1.5733*** -0.2429 -0.2326 -0.2474 
 (0.0668) (0.0571) (0.0569) (0.4312) (0.3775) (0.3736) (0.2266) (0.1834) (0.1837) 
Herfindahl-index -0.0150*** -0.0098 -0.0150*** -0.1731*** -0.1840*** -0.1763*** -0.0737*** -0.0934*** -0.0745*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0067) (0.0047) (0.0266) (0.0380) (0.0261) (0.0144) (0.0203) (0.0143) 
% of managerial ownership -0.4156 -0.4071 -0.8659 -0.2005 -0.2689 -4.8552 1.1189 0.8627 -0.3750 
 (0.4666) (0.4675) (0.7228) (2.8742) (2.8813) (4.0136) (1.5839) (1.5652) (2.4506) 
ISS against dummy -25.0095*** -25.0067*** -25.0098***    -6.5208*** -6.5111*** -6.5097*** 
 (0.5600) (0.5598) (0.5592)    (0.4749) (0.4751) (0.4748) 
Confidential voting dummy -0.4045** -0.4074** -0.4101** -0.6753 -0.6359 -0.6032 0.0718 0.0681 0.0657 
 (0.1748) (0.1746) (0.1749) (1.1070) (1.1141) (1.1228) (0.5445) (0.5445) (0.5454) 
Majority voting dummy 0.1647 0.1733 0.1660 -0.3762 -0.4328 -0.4159 0.3224 0.2818 0.3325 
 (0.1366) (0.1369) (0.1365) (1.1040) (1.1061) (1.0964) (0.5421) (0.5388) (0.5449) 
Market capitalization 0.1484** 0.1498** 0.1499** 0.7773** 0.7674** 0.8235** 0.6731*** 0.6685*** 0.6822*** 
 (0.0623) (0.0620) (0.0623) (0.3324) (0.3325) (0.3287) (0.1501) (0.1506) (0.1512) 
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Table 11. (continued).  
 % of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
% of voting 
support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Market to book 0.3088*** 0.3044*** 0.3032*** -0.0789 -0.0710 -0.1796 0.1011 0.1240 0.0724 
 (0.0759) (0.0760) (0.0766) (0.4891) (0.4913) (0.4805) (0.2258) (0.2257) (0.2287) 
Past performance 0.2673** 0.2681** 0.2663** -0.7677 -0.7724 -0.8508 0.3767 0.3750 0.3652 
 (0.1283) (0.1282) (0.1281) (0.7226) (0.7225) (0.7247) (0.4977) (0.5016) (0.4970) 
Director elections(M) 10.8390*** 10.8287*** 10.8308*** 15.6264*** 15.5416*** 15.5227*** 9.7238*** 9.7515*** 9.7172*** 
 (1.7926) (1.8009) (1.7961) (4.1716) (4.1732) (4.1765) (2.3401) (2.3449) (2.3422) 
Director related(M) 1.4485 1.4364 1.4410 -0.9328 -0.9773 -1.0775 2.2629 2.3397 2.3403 
 (1.8736) (1.8816) (1.8768) (8.3867) (8.4633) (8.3405) (2.7535) (2.7522) (2.7488) 
Compensation related(M) 3.8754** 3.8637** 3.8659** 8.4077** 8.3380** 8.3034** 7.7469*** 7.8023*** 7.7425*** 
 (1.7897) (1.7980) (1.7931) (4.1704) (4.1722) (4.1756) (2.3564) (2.3612) (2.3580) 
Say on pay frequency(M) -5.3662*** -5.3785*** -5.3743*** -14.4303*** -14.5131*** -14.5297*** -6.7221*** -6.6304*** -6.7365*** 
 (1.8375) (1.8454) (1.8407) (4.2682) (4.2655) (4.2720) (2.4208) (2.4271) (2.4209) 
Antitakeover related(M) -2.5858 -2.6035 -2.5971 1.8938 2.0303 1.9567 3.6947 3.7083 3.6812 
 (1.9471) (1.9545) (1.9504) (5.0123) (5.0049) (5.0002) (2.7577) (2.7831) (2.7564) 
Routine/Business 
related(M) 
12.5349*** 12.5230*** 12.5256*** 8.2654* 8.3364* 8.3714* 4.5722* 4.7437* 4.5762* 
 (1.7832) (1.7915) (1.7866) (4.6405) (4.6390) (4.6460) (2.5908) (2.5980) (2.5920) 
Capitalization related(M) -3.7456* -3.7539* -3.7559* 3.3160 3.2346 3.2459 5.4516** 5.5443** 5.4449** 
 (1.9655) (1.9734) (1.9686) (4.6305) (4.6269) (4.6233) (2.4559) (2.4654) (2.4546) 
Reorganization and Mergers 
related(M) 
-1.2891 -1.2979 -1.2974 -3.3422 -3.4741 -3.9610 6.0779** 6.1852** 6.0634** 
 (2.0291) (2.0351) (2.0318) (8.5587) (8.6043) (8.6824) (2.7481) (2.7429) (2.7487) 
          
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 72560 72560 72560 5219 5219 5219 3062 3062 3062 
R-squared 0.5850 0.5851 0.5850 0.4072 0.4069 0.4089 0.3010 0.3020 0.3015 
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Results of voting support and employee ownership in DC plans. Results are as follows: first panel-all management proposals; middle panel-subsample where ISS 
opposed management proposals; last panel-subsample with close votes (30% to 60% voting support). I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions from 
equation (1). The dependent variable is the percentage of “For” votes on proposals. I include interaction terms between employee ownership dummy and 
governance variables (E-index, % of institutional ownership, and Herfindahl-index). All other variables are defined in Table A2 in the Appendix. All 
specifications are estimated with year dummies and Fama-French 12 industry dummies (not reported). Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at 
firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except the E-index. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 12 
Employee Ownership in DC Plans, Voting Support, and Managerial Ownership 
 Management proposals Shareholder proposals 
 % of voting 
support  
(1) 
% of voting 
support  
(2) 
% of voting 
support  
(3) 
% of voting 
support 
(4)  
% of voting 
support  
(5) 
% of voting 
support 
(6)  
% of employee ownership in equity market value 0.0401*   -0.3164   
 (0.0241)   (0.2009)   
% managerial ownership 0.0872***   -0.5335***   
 (0.0169)   (0.1646)   
% of employee & managerial ownership  0.0813***   -0.4776***  
  (0.0150)   (0.1407)  
% of employee ownership equity market value   -0.0237   1.5245 
* Indicator of low managerial ownership    (0.1403)   (1.6936) 
% of employee ownership equity market value   0.2075   -6.6304*** 
* Indicator of medium managerial ownership    (0.1745)   (2.1113) 
% of employee ownership equity market value   -0.0030   -0.2920 
* Indicator of high managerial ownership    (0.0331)   (0.2085) 
Indicator of medium managerial ownership    0.0320   -0.6452* 
   (0.0332)   (0.3459) 
Indicator of high managerial ownership    0.0711*   0.5671 
   (0.0479)   (0.9296) 
E-index -0.3223*** -0.3348*** -0.3652*** 1.2107** 1.2606** 1.2787** 
 (0.0572) (0.0568) (0.0591) (0.5260) (0.5196) (0.5181) 
% of institutional ownership -0.0151*** -0.0149*** -0.0213*** 0.1366** 0.1368** 0.1366*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0539) (0.0537) (0.0513) 
Herfindahl-index -0.3754 -0.3838 -0.3297 -0.2579 -0.2993 -0.3067 
 (0.4707) (0.4709) (0.4777) (3.4455) (3.4112) (3.4374) 
ISS against -25.0016*** -24.9970*** -24.9345*** -27.4305*** -27.4585*** -27.4360*** 
 (0.5593) (0.5603) (0.5664) (0.8658) (0.8590) (0.8668) 
Confidential voting -0.4072** -0.4170** -0.4044** -0.3547 -0.3623 -0.4474 
 (0.1766) (0.1767) (0.1811) (1.2756) (1.2758) (1.2570) 
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Table 12. (continued). 
 Management proposals Shareholder proposals 
 % of voting 
support  
(1) 
% of voting 
support  
(2) 
% of voting 
support  
(3) 
% of voting 
support 
(4)  
% of voting 
support  
(5) 
% of voting 
support 
(6)  
Majority voting dummy 0.1723 0.1613 0.1385 -3.7007*** -3.6698*** -3.8489*** 
 (0.1370) (0.1378) (0.1368) (1.4166) (1.4172) (1.4056) 
Market capitalization 0.1566** 0.1530** 0.1229* -2.2750*** -2.2402*** -2.3546*** 
 (0.0621) (0.0618) (0.0683) (0.5055) (0.5001) (0.5266) 
Market to book 0.3005*** 0.3091*** 0.3241*** 0.4587 0.4065 0.5192 
 (0.0760) (0.0756) (0.0774) (0.6594) (0.6543) (0.6579) 
Past performance 0.2563** 0.2590** 0.2738** 1.6195 1.6354 1.8419 
 (0.1288) (0.1287) (0.1298) (1.5631) (1.5620) (1.5295) 
Director elections(M) 10.8148*** 10.8257*** 10.8101***    
 (1.8260) (1.8287) (1.8113)    
Director related(M) 1.4180 1.4188 1.4475    
 (1.9054) (1.9078) (1.8906)    
Compensation related(M) 3.8456** 3.8591** 3.8487**    
 (1.8231) (1.8258) (1.8084)    
Say on pay frequency(M) -5.3959*** -5.3836*** -5.3982***    
 (1.8694) (1.8720) (1.8555)    
Antitakeover related(M) -2.6301 -2.6162 -2.6220    
 (1.9785) (1.9808) (1.9654)    
Routine/Business related(M) 12.5010*** 12.5119*** 12.5056***    
 (1.8169) (1.8195) (1.8020)    
Capitalization related(M) -3.7774* -3.7688* -3.7991*    
 (1.9968) (1.9994) (1.9847)    
Reorganization and Mergers related(M) -1.3110 -1.2809 -1.3158    
 (2.0562) (2.0581) (2.0450)    
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Table 12. (continued). 
 Management proposals Shareholder proposals 
 % of voting 
support  
(1) 
% of voting 
support  
(2) 
% of voting 
support  
(3) 
% of voting 
support 
(4)  
% of voting 
support  
(5) 
% of voting 
support 
(6)  
Director related(S)    9.1980*** 9.1862*** 9.0691*** 
    (2.1277) (2.1327) (2.0999) 
Compensation related(S)    -4.2020** -4.1931** -4.3033** 
    (1.8487) (1.8537) (1.8248) 
Corporate governance related(S)    12.0679*** 12.0137*** 11.7433*** 
    (2.0243) (2.0315) (2.0027) 
Routine/Business related(S)    -4.3106** -4.2970** -4.1883** 
    (1.9251) (1.9270) (1.8878) 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 72560 72560 72560 2883 2883 2883 
R-squared 0.5846 0.5845 0.5829 0.5582 0.5578 0.5583 
Results relating voting support and employee ownership in DC plans. The left panel includes the results from all management proposals and the right panel includes 
the results from all shareholder proposals. I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions from the equation (1). The dependent variable is the percentage of 
“For” votes on proposals. Indicator of medium employee & managerial ownership is equal to 1 if % of employee and managerial ownership falls within the medium 
tertile, and 0 otherwise. Indicator of high employee & managerial ownership is equal to 1 if % of employee and managerial ownership falls within the highest 
tertile, and 0 otherwise. I include interactions of % of employee ownership in firms’ equity market value with Indicator of low/medium/high employee & managerial 
ownership. All other variables are defined in Table A2 in the Appendix. All specifications are estimated with year dummies and Fama-French 12 industry dummies 
but not reported. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except 
the E-index. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 13 
Employee ownership in DC plans and voting support estimated with 2SLS (all management) 
 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Employee 
ownership 
dummy 
% of voting 
support 
% of employee 
ownership in DC 
plans 
% of voting 
support 
% of employee 
ownership in 
market cap. 
% of voting 
support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Employee ownership dummy  1.3138***     
  (0.4527)     
% of employee ownership in DC plans    0.0103   
    (0.0142)   
% of employee ownership in equity market 
value 
     0.4115*** 
      (0.0997) 
Interest burden -0.1223  -9.6232***  -0.5140*  
 (0.0867)  (2.4470)  (0.2636)  
DB plan without company stock 0.2323***  5.3775***  0.6809***  
 (0.0471)  (1.9135)  (0.2180)  
DB plan with company stock 0.0613*  1.3807  0.5496***  
 (0.0316)  (1.0020)  (0.1199)  
% of managerial ownership -0.0000 0.0879*** -0.0135 0.0870*** -0.0087 0.0924*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0057) (0.0642) (0.0057) (0.0077) (0.0059) 
E-index 0.0473*** -0.3814*** 1.5671*** -0.3315*** 0.1733*** -0.3971*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0329) (0.3364) (0.0331) (0.0392) (0.0311) 
% of institutional ownership -0.0014* -0.0136*** -0.1792*** -0.0139*** -0.0177*** -0.0080*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0258) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0027) 
Herfindahl-index 0.1103 -0.5013*** 0.8214 -0.3664** 0.2691 -0.4816*** 
 (0.0864) (0.1666) (2.8235) (0.1611) (0.3799) (0.1634) 
ISS Against dummy 0.0245 -25.0280*** 0.7319 -25.0062*** 0.0746 -25.0221*** 
 (0.0177) (0.2034) (0.5659) (0.2038) (0.0721) (0.2041) 
Confidential voting dummy 0.0149 -0.4138*** -0.6046 -0.3903*** 0.1822 -0.4812*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0658) (1.3679) (0.0668) (0.1780) (0.0689) 
Majority voting dummy 0.0223 0.1434** -0.8537 0.1867*** 0.1011 0.1216* 
 (0.0256) (0.0662) (0.8293) (0.0673) (0.1053) (0.0667) 
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Table 13. (continued).  
 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Employee 
ownership 
dummy 
% of voting 
support 
% of employee 
ownership in DC 
plans 
% of voting 
support 
% of employee 
ownership in 
market cap. 
% of voting 
support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Market capitalization 0.0051 0.1387*** 1.2919*** 0.1397*** -0.0990** 0.1754*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0214) (0.3552) (0.0297) (0.0406) (0.0211) 
Market to book -0.0257* 0.3307*** 0.5654 0.2868*** -0.1090*** 0.3492*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0327) (0.5069) (0.0316) (0.0372) (0.0330) 
Past performance -0.0147 0.2831*** 0.5797 0.2528*** 0.0260 0.2565*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0755) (0.4179) (0.0748) (0.0437) (0.0750) 
Director elections(M) -0.0560 10.8839*** 1.4007 10.7927*** -0.1701 10.8940*** 
 (0.0761) (1.1262) (1.3228) (1.1305) (0.3339) (1.1369) 
Director related(M) -0.0442 1.4824 4.1176** 1.3793 0.1339 1.3870 
 (0.0778) (1.2216) (1.8925) (1.2260) (0.3650) (1.2310) 
Compensation related(M) -0.0696 3.9319*** 1.0364 3.8254*** -0.2029 3.9408*** 
 (0.0757) (1.1317) (1.3082) (1.1358) (0.3329) (1.1422) 
Say on pay frequency(M) -0.0703 -5.3102*** 1.1913 -5.4173*** -0.1954 -5.3075*** 
 (0.0761) (1.2228) (1.3327) (1.2269) (0.3330) (1.2327) 
Antitakeover related(M) -0.0967 -2.5097** 0.6082 -2.6451** -0.2188 -2.5344** 
 (0.0793) (1.2801) (1.5349) (1.2836) (0.3600) (1.2891) 
Routine/Business related(M) -0.0734 12.5939*** 1.1653 12.4821*** -0.1418 12.5711*** 
 (0.0760) (1.1275) (1.3271) (1.1313) (0.3332) (1.1378) 
Capitalization related(M) -0.0599 -3.6943*** 2.0416 -3.8019*** -0.0925 -3.7148*** 
 (0.0760) (1.2517) (1.5137) (1.2557) (0.3383) (1.2611) 
Reorganization and Mergers related(M) -0.0910 -1.2148 -0.9741 -1.3272 -0.6315* -1.0611 
 (0.0796) (1.5081) (1.6563) (1.5111) (0.3554) (1.5189) 
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Table 13. (continued). 
 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Employee 
ownership 
dummy 
% of voting 
support 
% of employee 
ownership in DC 
plans 
% of voting 
support 
% of employee 
ownership in 
market cap. 
% of voting 
support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistics for endogeneity 3.3  0.1  14.2  
Observations 72560 72560 72560 72560 72560 72560 
R-squared 0.1174 0.5836 0.2115 0.5846 0.1691 0.5790 
2SLS regression results relating voting support and employee ownership in DC plans. The results from the first stage are reported in columns (1), (3), and (5), 
where the dependent variables are employee ownership, % of employee ownership in DC plans, and % of employee ownership in firms’ equity market value, 
respectively. The results from the second stage are reported in columns (2), (4), and (6), where the dependent variable is the percentage of “For” votes on proposals. 
Interest burden is defined as the interest expense scaled by operating income before depreciation; cash flow shortfall is defined as cash flow used for investment 
plus dividends less cash flow from operations, scaled by total assets; dividend yield is dividend scaled by the fiscal year closing stock price; a company is categorized 
as having a DB plan without company stock if all DB plans do not include company stock; a company is categorized as having a DB plan with company stock if at 
least one DB plan includes company stock. I average Interest burden, cash flow shortfall, and dividend yield over three years. All other variables are defined in 
Table A2 in the Appendix. All specifications are estimated with year dummies and Fama-French 12 industry dummies but not reported. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered at firm level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles except the E-index. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX B  
SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURE AND TABLES 
 
Figure A. The distribution of the percentage voting support for close votes. The distribution of percentage of voting support for management sponsored 
proposals of close votes. The Y-axis indicates the frequency of the proposals, and X axis indicates the percentage of voting support.  
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Table A1  
Sample Construction 
 Number of  
plan-years 
Number of  
firm-years 
Number of  
firms 
[Form 5500 in defined contribution (DC) plans on 2002-2011]    
    after mapping with CUSIP identifier and financial data (Full Form 5500 sample) 28,834 22,540 3,265 
    after matching with data on institutional ownership  28,000 21,766 3,150 
    after matching with data on managerial ownership 18,365 13,332 1,857 
    after matching with data on governance 15,597 11,100 1,695 
    
[ISS Voting Analytics database on 2003-2012 ]    
    after matching with voting data (Final sample)   10,093 1,695 
Construction of the sample data. The initial data begins with firms listed on Voting Analytics during the period from 2003 to 2012. Using the IRS Employer 
Identification Number (EIN) and company names, I merge the initial sample firms with firms listed in Form 5500 that have at least one DC plan over the period 
from 2002 to 2011. The full Form 5500 sample is matched with CRSP, Compustat RiskMetrics (governance), Thomson Financial’s CDA/Spectrum (institutional 
ownership), and Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp (managerial ownership). For the final sample, the matched sample is merged with voting outcomes. 
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Table A2  
Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
Employee ownership dummy One if a firm provide company stock in DC plans, and zero otherwise.  
% of employee ownership in DC plans The percentage of employee holdings invested in DC plans.  
% of employee ownership in a firm’s market value The percentage of a firm’s equity market value of employee holdings invested in DC plans. 
% of employee and managerial ownership The percentage of a firm’s equity market value of employee holdings invested in DC plans plus the 
percentage of equity market value managerial holdings owned by top five executives.  
E-index The sum of six antitakeover defense provisions, following Bebchuk et al. (2005). 
% of institutional ownership The aggregate equity holdings owned by institutional investors divided by the market value of the firm. 
Herfindahl index The sum of squared sales of firms in 3-digit SIC industry, following Giroud and Mueller (2010). 
% of managerial ownership The aggregate equity holdings owned by top five executives divided by the market value of the firm. 
Market capitalization The natural log of total number of shares outstanding times the closing price at the end of the year of the 
proposal. 
Market to book The sum of market capitalization of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of total 
assets. 
Past performance The previous year’s buy-and-hold market adjusted returns. 
ISS against dummy One when proposals are opposed by ISS, and zero otherwise. 
Confidential voting dummy One if how shareholders vote their proxy card is kept confidential. 
Majority voting dummy One if a firm’s directors are elected when they receive more than 50% of voting support. 
The data were obtained from Form 5500 (employee ownership in DC plans), Compustat RiskMetrics (governance), Thomson Financial’s CDA/Spectrum 
(institutional ownership), and Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp (managerial ownership). 
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Table A3  
Frequency and Percentage Support for Proposals by Categories  
Category  All firms 
Firms without employee 
ownership 
Firms with employee 
ownership 
 Freq.(%) Obs Mean (%) Obs Mean (%) Obs Mean (%) 
Panel A. Management proposals opposed by ISS        
Director elections 72.1 3,764 72.8 1,682 71.9 2,082 73.5 
  with Majority voting rules     7.5 391 74.7 131 73.4 260 75.4 
  with Plurality voting rules 64.6 3,373 72.6 1,551 71.8 1,822 73.2 
Director related 0.3 17 56.2 6 57.2 11 55.7 
Compensation related 16.6 868 64.8 424 64.3 444 65.3 
Say on pay frequency 6.9 362 41.0 181 40.2 181 41.8 
Antitakeover related 0.9 45 57.0 20 56.0 25 57.8 
Routine/Business related 1.6 81 66.8 29 70.0 52 65.1 
Capitalization related 1.2 61 63.1 22 66.6 39 61.1 
Reorganization and Mergers related 0.1 7 54.8 3 64.9 4 46.6 
Others 0.3 14 55.3 9 61.9 5 43.5 
Total 100.0 5,219 68.8 2,376 67.9 2,843 69.6 
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Table A3. (continued).  
Category All firms   
Firms 
without 
employee 
ownership  
Firms with 
employee 
ownership  
 Freq.(%) Obs Mean (%) Obs Mean (%) Obs Mean (%) 
Panel B. Management proposals close votes        
Director elections 52.7 1,615 60.1 788 59.0 827 61.1 
  with Majority voting rules 4.5 138 63.9 54 64.8 84 63.3 
  with Plurality voting rules 48.2 1,477 59.7 734 58.6 743 60.8 
Director related 1.1 35 58.5 14 56.5 21 59.9 
Compensation related 29.6 907 60.3 482 60.1 425 60.5 
Say on pay frequency 7.0 215 44.3 105 43.3 110 45.3 
Antitakeover related 2.1 64 57.0 33 57.7 31 56.2 
Routine/Business related 2.0 60 57.3 18 54.8 42 58.4 
Capitalization related 3.7 112 60.6 57 62.9 55 58.2 
Reorganization and Mergers related 1.0 32 63.2 17 65.4 15 60.6 
Others 0.7 22 52.4 11 56.2 11 48.5 
Total 100.0 3,062 58.9 1,525 58.3 1,537 59.4 
Frequency and percentage of voting support for proposals by categories of all sample firms, firms without employee ownership in DC plans, and firms with 
employee ownership in DC plans. The sample consists of management proposals opposed by the ISS in Panel A and management proposals with voting support 
between 30% and 70% in Panel B. I obtain the data on aggregate voting outcomes of the period 2003-2012 from ISS Voting Analytics. For each proposal type, 
the number of and the average level of voting support are reported. I compute the level of voting support by dividing the total number of shares voted for by their 
base which serves as the dominator of the calculation of voting support rate. The three types of bases are total number of “For” and “Against” votes, total 
number of “For”, “Against”, and “Abstain” votes, and total number of outstanding shares eligible for a vote. 
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Table A4 
Proposal Description 
Category Proposal Description 
Number 
of proposal 
% of 
Proposal 
% of 
Voting Support 
Panel A. Management Proposals     
     
Director election Elect Directors 54,141 99.5 94.6 
 Elect Directors (Opposition Slate) (INACTIVE) 199 0.4 93.2 
 Elect Directors (Management Slate)  50 0.1 83.3 
     
Director related Declassify the Board of Directors 284 49.0 84.7 
 Company Specific--Board-Related 75 11.4 87.2 
 Require Majority Vote for the Election 63 11.0 89.3 
 Fix Number of Directors 46 8.3 95.2 
 Approve Increase in Size of Board 23 3.9 86.6 
 Eliminate Cumulative Voting 20 2.9 74.3 
 Establish Range For Board Size 15 2.9 89.0 
 Approve Decrease in Size of Board 15 2.7 85.0 
     
Compensation related Approve Remuneration Report 2265 28.3 89.1 
 Amend Omnibus Stock Plan 1792 22.4 81.1 
 Approve Omnibus Stock Plan 1167 14.6 81.0 
 Approve/Amend Executive Incentive Bonus Plan 1048 13.1 94.0 
 Amend Qualified Employee Stock Purchase Plan 516 6.4 93.8 
 Approve Qualified Employee Stock Purchase Plan 203 2.5 94.1 
 Amend Stock Option Plan 190 2.4 78.9 
 Amend Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan 121 1.5 80.0 
 Approve Non-Employee Director Omnibus Stock Plan 96 1.2 81.7 
 Amend Non-Employee Director Omnibus Stock Plan 91 1.1 80.9 
 Approve Stock Option Plan 77 1.0 80.0 
 Approve Repricing of Options 65 0.8 71.4 
 Approve Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan 64 0.8 81.6 
 Amend Restricted Stock Plan 50 0.6 90.1 
 Approve/Amend Deferred Compensation Plan 44 0.5 90.2 
 Approve Restricted Stock Plan 32 0.4 80.6 
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Table A4. (continued).  
Category Proposal Description 
Number 
of proposal 
% of 
Proposal 
% of 
Voting Support 
Compensation related Approve Outside Director Stock Awards/Options in Lieu of Cash 30 0.4 93.4 
 Approve Nonqualified Employee Stock Purchase Plan 29 0.4 93.7 
 Amend Non-Employee Director Restricted  Stock Plan 29 0.4 88.0 
 Amend Nonqualified Employee Stock Purchase Plan 26 0.3 96.4 
 Company-Specific-Compensation-Related 25 0.3 86.4 
 Approve Non-Employee Director Restricted Stock Plan 23 0.3 85.8 
     
Say on pay frequency Say on pay frequency 1,073 100.0 71.9 
     
Antitakeover related Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirement 209 51.5 82.9 
 Adjourn Meeting 75 18.5 83.3 
 Adopt or Amend Shareholder Rights Plan(Poison Pill) 27 6.7 61.0 
 Company-Specific--Organization-Related 23 5.7 79.7 
 Permit Board to Amend Bylaws Without Shareholder Consent 13 3.2 73.7 
 Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter to Remove Antitakeover 
Provisions 
12 3.0 84.3 
     
Routine/Business related Ratify Auditors 8,877 97.8 97.9 
 Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter-Non-Routine 122 1.3 79.9 
 Change Company Name 30 0.3 90.9 
 Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter General Matters 24 0.3 87.4 
 Other Business 23 0.3 50.2 
     
Capitalization related Increase Authorized Common Stock 457 69.9 79.3 
 Company Specific-Equity-Related 40 6.1 78.7 
 Approve Reverse Stock Split 37 5.7 69.7 
 Approve/Amend Conversion of Securities 18 2.8 94.7 
 Eliminate Class of Common Stock 11 1.7 85.0 
     
Reorganization and Mergers related Approve Merger Agreement 128 56.4 79.7 
 Issue Shares in Connection with an Acquisition 65 28.6 93.8 
     
Others Preferred Proposal 34 25.4 92.3 
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Table A4. (continued). 
Category Proposal Description 
Number 
of proposal 
% of 
Proposal 
% of 
Voting Support 
Panel A. Shareholder Proposals     
     
Director related Declassify the Board of Directors 280 23.5 67.7 
 Require a Majority Vote for the Election of Directors 267 22.4 50.6 
 Restore or Provide for Cumulative Voting 159 13.3 32.8 
 Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter -- Call Special Meetings 155 13.0 45.1 
 Elect Directors (Opposition Slate) 143 12.0 87.4 
 Amend Vote Requirements to Amend Articles/Bylaws/Charter 23 1.9 61.4 
 Establish Other Board Committee 22 1.8 17.8 
 Require Director Nominee Qualifications 22 1.8 15.0 
 Add Women and Minorities to the Board 22 1.8 23.2 
 Company-Specific Board-Related 18 1.5 28.9 
 Establish Term Limits for Directors 16 1.3 7.3 
 Remove Existing Directors 15 1.3 43.0 
 Require Majority of Independent Directors on Board 14 1.2 30.3 
 Require Two Candidates for Each Board Seat 11 0.9 8.8 
     
Compensation related Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive 194 20.7 42.0 
 Performance-Based and/or Time-Based Equity Awards 138 14.7 29.1 
 Stock Retention/Holding Period 86 9.2 24.9 
 Limit/Prohibit Executive Stock-Based Awards 81 8.7 22.1 
 Review Executive Compensation (INACTIVE) 75 8.0 16.3 
 Report on Pay Disparity 52 5.6 10.3 
 Expense Stock Options (INACTIVE) 48 5.1 53.4 
 Pay for Superior Performance 46 4.9 28.7 
 Compensation- Miscellaneous Company Specific 38 4.1 28.2 
 Increase Disclosure of Executive Compensation 25 2.7 16.4 
 Claw-back of Payments under Restatement 22 2.4 29.4 
 Limit Executive Compensation 20 2.1 8.5 
 Submit SERP to Shareholder Vote 20 2.1 35.9 
 Death Benefits / Golden Coffins 17 2.0 35.0 
 Link Executive Compensation to Social Issues 16 1.8 7.3 
 Double Trigger on Equity Plans 16 1.7 37.2 
 67 
 
 
Table A4. (continued).  
Category Proposal Description 
Number 
of proposal 
% of 
Proposal 
% of 
Voting 
Support 
Governance related Submit Shareholder Rights Plan (Poison Pill) to Shareholder Vote 119 31.6 57.9 
 Company Specific-Governance Related 74 19.7 42.8 
 Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirement 69 18.4 68.2 
 Eliminate or Restrict Severance Agreements (Change-in Control) 50 13.3 53.7 
 Reincorporate in Another State  22 5.9 16.9 
 Submit Severance Agreement (Change-in-Control) to Shareholder Vote 20 5.3 50.4 
 Approve/Amend Terms of Existing Poison Pill 10 2.7 38.1 
     
Business related  Separate Chairman and CEO Positions 273 91.3 30.0 
     
Miscellaneous Political Contributions/Activities 278 42.4 20.0 
 Company-Specific -- Shareholder Miscellaneous 181 27.6 25.9 
 Adopt Sexual Orientation Anti-bias Policy 71 10.8 27.7 
 Charitable Contributions 28 4.3 8.0 
 Report on EEO 23 3.5 16.3 
 Animal Welfare 20 3.0 7.3 
 Animal Testing 15 2.3 7.3 
 Animal Slaughter Methods 24 2.1 7.1 
 Disclose Prior Government Service 13 2.0 8.3 
 Glass Ceiling 13 2.0 12.2 
     
Social issues Social Proposal 144 16.1 10.9 
 Improve Human Rights Standards or Policies 103 11.5 13.1 
 Sustainability Report 66 7.4 21.1 
 Climate Change 50 5.6 14.6 
 Community -Environment Impact 44 4.9 20.9 
 Anti-Social Proposal 42 4.7 7.5 
 Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) 39 4.3 7.6 
 GHG Emissions 33 3.7 19.6 
 Report on Environmental Policies 31 3.5 13.5 
 
 
 68 
 
 
Table A4. (continued).  
Category Proposal Description 
Number 
of proposal 
% of 
Proposal 
% of 
Voting Support 
 MacBride Principles 29 3.2 10.1 
 Weapons - Related 26 2.9 7.4 
 Health Care - Related 26 2.9 7.4 
 Workplace Code of Conduct (INACTIVE) 21 2.3 13.6 
 Report on Foreign Military Sales/Defense Business 20 2.2 7.3 
 Environmental - Related Miscellaneous 20 2.2 9.5 
 Nuclear Power - Related 19 2.1 8.7 
 China Principles 15 1.7 8.1 
 Tobacco - Related - Miscellaneous 15 1.7 8.2 
 Drug Pricing 14 1.6 9.0 
 Renewable Energy 14 1.6 12.5 
 Internet Censorship 13 1.4 19.4 
 Vendor Standards (INACTIVE) 12 1.3 12.7 
 Product Safety 11 1.2 17.4 
 Recycling 10 1.1 14.2 
     
Other Provide Right to Act by Written Consent 60 75.9 47.3 
Agenda items by each category of proposals when the number of proposals of an item is submitted more than 10 times over the sample period. The data is from 
the ISS Voting Analytics database during the period of 2003-2012. For each item, the number of items, the ratio of items, and the average level of voting support 
are reported. The sample consists of all management-sponsored proposals in Panel A and all shareholder sponsored proposals in Panel B.  
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